It's often said that you can't hope to apply Iraq strategy to Afghanistan because the two countries/conflicts are so different. But Stanley McChrystal seems not to agree:
In Iraq, the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq program got as many as 100,000 Sunni insurgents to stop fighting the U.S., or even take up arms against the group Al Qaeda in Iraq, by forming paramilitary groups. Efforts are underway to move them into state security forces or provide other jobs. U.S. military officers deployed in Afghanistan's south, the Taliban heartland, say they are being encouraged to test similar ideas in the field.
Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, head of U.S. and Western forces in Afghanistan, personally wooed a key architect of the Iraq program out of planned retirement to help craft the drive, which is to be aimed initially at low-level Taliban fighters.
British Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, who arrived in Afghanistan at the end of August to help develop the plan, said a crucial element would be acknowledging that many insurgents believe that the West plans an open-ended occupation of Afghanistan.
Other fighters, he said, are acting on personal grievances related to powerful clan and tribal loyalties, such as a home destroyed or a relative killed, rather than subscribing to the overarching ideological agenda of Taliban leaders.
"We have an opportunity to reset the conditions," Lamb, former deputy commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, said in an interview at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force headquarters. The vast majority of Taliban foot soldiers, he said, are "misguided -- they have fought well for a bad cause."
(Emphasis mine.) Of course a plan like this--turning the locals against the insurgents--doesn't work if people think you will fight with limited force and will be leaving soon.
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COMMENTS (3)
"... a plan like this ... doesn't work if people think you will fight with limited force."
Then hopefully the Taliban lacks net access, else they would know that the United States has only about 50,000 regular troops to delpoy, with half as many more in the National Guard. Even if Obama grants Gen. McChrystal's troop request, America's fighting forces will be entirely committed, with no meaningful increase possible for about a year. Though to TNR's credit, it scrupulously avoids interjecting any consideration of actual troop availability and readiness into discussions of war policy, so the Talibs won't learn about our bare military cupboards here.
"... a plan like this ... doesn't work if people think you will fight with limited force."
Then hopefully the Taliban lacks net access, else they would know that the United States has only about 50,000 regular troops to delpoy, with half as many more in the National Guard. Even if Obama grants Gen. McChrystal's troop request, America's fighting forces will be entirely committed, with no meaningful increase possible for about a year. Though to TNR's credit, it scrupulously avoids interjecting any consideration of actual troop availability and readiness into discussions of war policy, so the Talibs won't learn about our bare military cupboards here.
I'm delighted to see General Lamb on the case--he's a legitimate expert, and I hope he's listened to attentively.
In my view we have ample troop resources to do what needs to be done, especially as the increase in infantry forces of nearly 100,000 promised by Obama during the campaign comes on line. We should not, and will not, replicate the Soviet strategy. What the troops are doing is more important than how many there are, within reason. As soon as we recognize that "The Taliban" are mostly just the traditional fighters of the Pashtun nation who cannot under any conceivable strategy or regime be eliminated, the better.
Reasonable expectations are perhaps the most necessary element of the c ... view full comment
I'm delighted to see General Lamb on the case--he's a legitimate expert, and I hope he's listened to attentively.
In my view we have ample troop resources to do what needs to be done, especially as the increase in infantry forces of nearly 100,000 promised by Obama during the campaign comes on line. We should not, and will not, replicate the Soviet strategy. What the troops are doing is more important than how many there are, within reason. As soon as we recognize that "The Taliban" are mostly just the traditional fighters of the Pashtun nation who cannot under any conceivable strategy or regime be eliminated, the better.
Reasonable expectations are perhaps the most necessary element of the current strategy review. We don't need to make Afghanistan EU-ready to achieve our national security goals.
Excellent points, RP. Except about the 100,000-man infantry expansion. Congress has not yet begun seriously funding the Obama plan, and the Pentagon has not yet established a comprehensive plan for integrating them into the force structure. So speaking of 100,000 new infantrymen "coming on line" is an exercise in fantasy fiction. We might as well count all the elves in Middle Earth. The soonest we can expect any relief from Army expansion is mid-2012. Which, in terms of current war needs, is never.
Until these fantasy soldiers exist, any reasonable escalation of our presence in Afghanistan will leave the United States with no deployable reserve to speak of to deal with any crisis that may occ ... view full comment
Excellent points, RP. Except about the 100,000-man infantry expansion. Congress has not yet begun seriously funding the Obama plan, and the Pentagon has not yet established a comprehensive plan for integrating them into the force structure. So speaking of 100,000 new infantrymen "coming on line" is an exercise in fantasy fiction. We might as well count all the elves in Middle Earth. The soonest we can expect any relief from Army expansion is mid-2012. Which, in terms of current war needs, is never.
Until these fantasy soldiers exist, any reasonable escalation of our presence in Afghanistan will leave the United States with no deployable reserve to speak of to deal with any crisis that may occur in 2010 and the first half of 2011. I'm not advocating against sending the men we need to do the job, if we have them. But we must face squarely, in advance, the costs associated with this decision. Our enemies in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and countries in between will know that they have a window of American military weakness in which to act.