German philosopher Martin Heidegger gets a lot of bad press. And for good reason. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Nazis, he did and said and wrote some nasty things before and after serving as the rector of Freiburg University from 1933-1934, and though he eventually distanced himself from his earlier enthusiasm for Hitler, he seems never to have ceased believing that there was an "inner truth and greatness" (those are Heidegger's own words, spoken in a lecture from 1935) to the National Socialist movement. That sounds bad, and it is. By now, scholars have demonstrated beyond just about any reasonable doubt that, judged from moral and political standpoints, Heidegger was a pretty despicable human being.
But here's the thing: Heidegger also possessed the most powerful philosophical mind of the twentieth century. If he had written nothing besides Being and Time (1927), he would deserve to be recognized as Europe's greatest philosopher since the death of G.W.F. Hegel in 1831. (I realize that for many philosophy professors trained in the Anglo-American tradition, the judgment contained in the previous sentence is absurd on more than one level.) But Heidegger wrote much more than Being and Time. His collected works--including previously published books, transcripts of university lectures, private notebooks, and much else--will eventually run to over 100 volumes. There's a lot of redundancy in those books, some of it is impenetrable, but there are also frequent flashes of philosophical brilliance that rival the profoundest passages of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. And that means that rendering a global judgment of Heidegger and his legacy is extremely complicated.
Unless, that is, you're Carlin Romano. I'm referring to Romano's recent essay from the Chronicle of Higher Education in which he uses the sordid evidence of Heidegger's Nazi enthusiasms compiled in a just-translated book by French philosopher Emmanuel Faye to argue that the time has come to excommunicate Heidegger--or rather his writings and ideas--from the university. In Romano's view, "the pretentious old Black Forest babbler," the "provincial Nazi hack," should be considered "a buffoon" whose ideas are "the butt of jokes, not the subject of dissertations."
I've long admired Romano's essays for the Chronicle and the Philadelphia Inquirer. But this column is an intellectual disgrace, and one that the Chronicle should be ashamed for having published. I say this as someone who's very far from being one of the "acolytes" who "bizarrely venerate" Heidegger and his ideas. I've written critically about his thought on a couple of occasions myself and am in complete agreement with Romano about the moral obscenity of Heidegger's actions (and of some of what he taught and wrote) during the 1930s. But moral disgust does not relieve a reader--let alone a critic--of the burden of intellectual engagement.
Faye is hardly the first to demonstrate continuities between Heidegger's thought and his political enthusiasms--or even to argue that the philosopher went out of his way in the mid-'30s to collapse the distinction between his philosophy and his public actions. Where Faye, according to Romano, goes further is in his efforts, using unpublished lectures from the Nazi period, to implicate Heidegger's entire philosophical corpus.
But this is absurd. Unlike many other philosophers, Heidegger was relentlessly, obsessively interested in a single question--the question of "Being." And his interest in that question--as well as his characteristic ways of posing it--can be traced back to the period of his first lectures courses (1919 to 1923), which took place well before the rise of National Socialism as a serious political force in Germany. While there can be no denying a striking and deeply troubling convergence between Heidegger's ontological investigations and Hitler's political movement--a convergence that very much deserves to be pondered and probed--those investigations pre-dated Hitler, just as they survived Hitler by several decades, as Heidegger's philosophical project continued on its way through the 1950s, '60s, and '70s.
Yet even if distinguishing between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics were as impossible as Romano (and Faye) would have us believe, that still would not justify excluding Heidegger's thought from serious reflection, study, and a place in the university. On the contrary, it would serve as an additional reason to wrestle with the challenge it poses.
I'm a liberal democrat and a humanist who considers totalitarianism in general, and Nazism in particular, to be moral and political abominations. I believe in the truth of science, and I like many things about technological modernity. I accept logic as a valid means of determining many forms of truth. And I happily accept the vision of Being that has prevailed in the Western world since the time of the ancient Greeks. In other words, I'm not inclined to follow Heidegger in its efforts to prepare the way for a more "primordial" encounter with Being by subverting these and other aspects of our world. But what a breathtakingly exciting experience it is to be forced to think about and make a case for, rather than lazily accept as self-evident, our most fundamental assumptions about the world and ourselves!
That is--or should be--what philosophy is all about. Which is why Heidegger was right at assert in an electrifying lecture course from 1929 that "philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance." What Carlin Romano has advocated in his essay is something altogether different--something tamer, more congenial, more comforting. Fine: By all means, let's offer another seminar on Rawls and the foundations of liberal justice. But surely there should also be a place in the university for a close encounter with a dramatically different style of thinking--with the stunningly radical (and perhaps radically erroneous) thought of Martin Heidegger.
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COMMENTS (36)
"Fine: By all means, let's offer another seminar on Rawls and the foundations of liberal justice. But surely there should also be a place in the university for a close encounter with a dramatically different style of thinking--with the stunningly radical (and perhaps radically erroneous) thought of Martin Heidegger."
This would be only the beginning. Going through Being and Time in order to admire its intricate architecture is not the same as dealing with it critically.
Let's also not forget that it was Heidegger who decided that Being and Time was not the right way to do philosophy and went off in a different direction in his later thought.
"Fine: By all means, let's offer another seminar on Rawls and the foundations of liberal justice. But surely there should also be a place in the university for a close encounter with a dramatically different style of thinking--with the stunningly radical (and perhaps radically erroneous) thought of Martin Heidegger."
This would be only the beginning. Going through Being and Time in order to admire its intricate architecture is not the same as dealing with it critically.
Let's also not forget that it was Heidegger who decided that Being and Time was not the right way to do philosophy and went off in a different direction in his later thought.
Here is another view on Heidegger and her student Hannah Arendt:
"The Evil of Banality:
Troubling new revelations about Arendt and Heidegger." By Ron Rosenbaum
http://www.slate.com/id/2234010/pagenum/all/
Here is another view on Heidegger and her student Hannah Arendt:
"The Evil of Banality:
Troubling new revelations about Arendt and Heidegger." By Ron Rosenbaum
http://www.slate.com/id/2234010/pagenum/all/
The ideas of philosophy are necessarily more problematic than the ideas of science. And that's important to acknowledge.
After all, if a scientist establishes "ideas" that have been replicated over and again by other scientists [experientially, empirically] no one would insist these ideas are wrong [let alone should be "banned"] if he or she was a Nazi.
It just doesn't work like that. Or at least not for long. Remember Lysenko? Even the Commies come around eventually to the laws of nature.
As a philosopher, however, Heideigger introduced ideas that, still today, are, within his own discipline, hotly debated.
As were the ideas of, say, Plato and aristotle---both champions of human slavery. Not ... view full comment
The ideas of philosophy are necessarily more problematic than the ideas of science. And that's important to acknowledge.
After all, if a scientist establishes "ideas" that have been replicated over and again by other scientists [experientially, empirically] no one would insist these ideas are wrong [let alone should be "banned"] if he or she was a Nazi.
It just doesn't work like that. Or at least not for long. Remember Lysenko? Even the Commies come around eventually to the laws of nature.
As a philosopher, however, Heideigger introduced ideas that, still today, are, within his own discipline, hotly debated.
As were the ideas of, say, Plato and aristotle---both champions of human slavery. Not only that, they both believed slavery was "natural". But: does anyone suggest we ban their ideas because of that?
Nope.
Heidegger however would have been well advised to apply his ruminations about "dasein" to the choices he himself made. Had he not been "thrown" in turn into a demographic quagmire out of which historically the Nazis rose?
Also, to speak of Being phenomenologically is to necessarily embed it in becoming. And becoming is a profoundly existential experience. We only pass over into Being when we BE dead. Right?
Linker:
...what a breathtakingly exciting experience it is to be forced to think about and make a case for, rather than lazily accept as self-evident, our most fundamental assumptions about the world and ourselves!
george:
That depends of course on what these "fundamental assumptions" are. Were not the Nazis and the Communists both convinced their own agendas reflected the most fundametnal [rational, moral] assumptions about human relationships?
Are not all True Believers still today [both ecclesiastic and secular] convinced of precisely the same dogmatic, doctrinaire assumptions about their own moral and political values? For example, locally, ask Marty Peretz about his assumptions here. With respect to, say, the Arabs. Or J Street.
For those who continue to embrace one or another moral and political variation on The Whole Truth, "comfort and assurance" are indeed the prime movers behind so much of what they think, feel and do.
It's a psychological agenda, in other words.
george walton
d/a/j
There's no question any more that there is an intimate link between Heidegger's attempt to think the question of being and his endorsement of national socialism. The affinity that prompted the "convergence" between H and Hitler was buried deep within H's philosophy. This is of course all the more reason to study Heidegger's thought rather than simply ignore it and hope that it will go away. Thanks for writing this response to Romano.
To my mind, the Rosenbaum piece is worse than Romano's, as it doesn't really have anything to do with Arendt's own thought. Of course, Arendt was a complicated and maybe even reluctant Zionist (Adam Kirch does good job of profiling this in the NY Post). I ... view full comment
There's no question any more that there is an intimate link between Heidegger's attempt to think the question of being and his endorsement of national socialism. The affinity that prompted the "convergence" between H and Hitler was buried deep within H's philosophy. This is of course all the more reason to study Heidegger's thought rather than simply ignore it and hope that it will go away. Thanks for writing this response to Romano.
To my mind, the Rosenbaum piece is worse than Romano's, as it doesn't really have anything to do with Arendt's own thought. Of course, Arendt was a complicated and maybe even reluctant Zionist (Adam Kirch does good job of profiling this in the NY Post). If you (and I) want to criticize her for lack of ahavath Israel, then yes - have at it. That's an important debate, and one that should be engaged honestly and directly. But Rosenbaum hasn't read any Arendt - particularly not her indictment of Heidegger in her remarks on the occasion of "Heidegger at 80." Nor, it would seem, has he read past the cover page of "The Banality of Evil." Yes, Arendt does argue that Eichman was banal, but this doesn't excuse his evil (much less ignore it) but actually highlights its threat. Evil is common, all too common, Arendt argues, and we all need to recognize this fact (which history has obviously proven true, given the no shortage of genocide and anti-semitism in this world).
benberger
"There's no question any more that there is an intimate link between Heidegger's attempt to think the question of being and his endorsement of national socialism. The affinity that prompted the "convergence" between H and Hitler was buried deep within H's philosophy."
It's not burreid that deep, benberger.
It's in the second half of Being and Time where he discusses "fate and destiny."
Your attack on Rosenbaum is groundless. How do you know that he hadn't read past ".... past the cover page of "The Banality of Evil?"
I suspect that he read more Arendt than you.
Just curious have you ever read "The Human Condition?"
In any case, your view that:
"Yes, Arendt does argue that Eichman ( ... view full comment
benberger
"There's no question any more that there is an intimate link between Heidegger's attempt to think the question of being and his endorsement of national socialism. The affinity that prompted the "convergence" between H and Hitler was buried deep within H's philosophy."
It's not burreid that deep, benberger.
It's in the second half of Being and Time where he discusses "fate and destiny."
Your attack on Rosenbaum is groundless. How do you know that he hadn't read past ".... past the cover page of "The Banality of Evil?"
I suspect that he read more Arendt than you.
Just curious have you ever read "The Human Condition?"
In any case, your view that:
"Yes, Arendt does argue that Eichman (sic) was banal, but this doesn't excuse his evil (much less ignore it) but actually highlights its threat."
Isn't accurate. Arendt never said that Eichmann "was banal." In this Rosenabum gets it more right than you did.
Also:
"Evil is common, all too common, Arendt argues, and we all need to recognize this fact (which history has obviously proven true, given the no shortage of genocide and anti-semitism in this world)."
Many, many thinkers have said this. What distinguished Arendt's view of evil from your banal paraphrase of her view is that she tried to salvage Saint Augustines' notion of evil.
Arendt was confused an probably psychologically traumatized by her experiences in Nazi Europe and no simple thesis about her pro or con will do.
I see that george is spending another sleepless night obsessing about Jews.
His idea of "true believers" is laughable.
George Walton is the real "true believer" posting here. (Had he known what the phrase meant he wouldn't use it so liberally). But then, George has no clue about what he says.
He as a lot of hateful passion and all of it directed at Jews.
I see that george is spending another sleepless night obsessing about Jews.
His idea of "true believers" is laughable.
George Walton is the real "true believer" posting here. (Had he known what the phrase meant he wouldn't use it so liberally). But then, George has no clue about what he says.
He as a lot of hateful passion and all of it directed at Jews.
I completely agree with your parting assessment, mr. dyer: no simple thesis about Arendt will do. "Banality," I believe, only appears at the end of Arendt's book on Eichmann - excusing the title. She does, however, characterize him as having "an extraordinary shallowness" and an "inability to think" which I think are quite clearly synonyms for "banal." I'm sure Rosenbaum wouldn't take issue with this point.
There's no mention of Hitler or national socialism in Being and Time. Obviously, however, since an important part of the text is concerned with political authenticity than it aligns with nazism in a lot of "deep" and important ways. When I wrote that this affinity or alignment is bu ... view full comment
I completely agree with your parting assessment, mr. dyer: no simple thesis about Arendt will do. "Banality," I believe, only appears at the end of Arendt's book on Eichmann - excusing the title. She does, however, characterize him as having "an extraordinary shallowness" and an "inability to think" which I think are quite clearly synonyms for "banal." I'm sure Rosenbaum wouldn't take issue with this point.
There's no mention of Hitler or national socialism in Being and Time. Obviously, however, since an important part of the text is concerned with political authenticity than it aligns with nazism in a lot of "deep" and important ways. When I wrote that this affinity or alignment is buried deep in Heidegger I meant not so much that it is hidden, but that it is a central part of his philosophy - not one that can be simply separated from history of metaphysics.
benberger “There's no mention of Hitler or national socialism in Being and Time. Obviously, however, since an important part of the text is concerned with political authenticity than it aligns with nazism in a lot of "deep" and important ways.”
Of course, there isn’t any mention of National Socialism. Being and Time was published in 1927, though it was composed much earlier. I agree with your overall comment, here.
“When I wrote that this affinity or alignment is buried deep in Heidegger I meant not so much that it is hidden, but that it is a central part of his philosophy - not one that can be simply separated from history of metaphysics.”’
Yes, indeed. Thanks for the clarificati ... view full comment
benberger “There's no mention of Hitler or national socialism in Being and Time. Obviously, however, since an important part of the text is concerned with political authenticity than it aligns with nazism in a lot of "deep" and important ways.”
Of course, there isn’t any mention of National Socialism. Being and Time was published in 1927, though it was composed much earlier. I agree with your overall comment, here.
“When I wrote that this affinity or alignment is buried deep in Heidegger I meant not so much that it is hidden, but that it is a central part of his philosophy - not one that can be simply separated from history of metaphysics.”’
Yes, indeed. Thanks for the clarification.
My problem with much of what passes for Heideggerians studies in US Universities is that it either uses it as a deconstruction aid (this term does come from Heidegger who called it I believe destruction “Abbau.”) or it is analyzed in a formalist manner (intrinsically) rather than critically. The historical context is rarely mentioned since it’s viewed as vulgar. Real Heideggerians, like real man, don’t bother with history.
“I completely agree with your parting assessment, mr. dyer: no simple thesis about Arendt will do."Banality," I believe, only appears at the end of Arendt's book on Eichmann - excusing the title. She does, however, characterize him as having "an extraordinary shallowness" and an "inability to think" which I think are quite clearly synonyms for "banal." I'm sure Rosenbaum wouldn't take issue with this point.”
Well, Rosenbaum isn’t the real issue, is it? His was a short article written for an online blog. It’s the views of the people he cited there are important.
From the article:
“Two new and damning critiques, one of Arendt and one of her longtime Nazi-sycophant lover, the philosopher Martin Heidegger, were published within 10 days of each other last month. The pieces cast further doubt on the overinflated, underexamined reputations of both figures and shed new light on their intellectually toxic relationship….
The first of the two new reports—and the one most overlooked here in America, perhaps because it's not online—appeared in the sober pages of London's Times Literary Supplement on Oct. 9. It was titled "Blame the Victim—Hannah Arendt Among the Nazis: the Historian and Her Sources." Arendt—the German-born refugee intellectual, author of the influential The Origins of Totalitarianism and the controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil—has come under fire before for "blaming the victim" in her Eichmann trial book, but the author of the TLS piece, the distinguished British scholar Bernard Wasserstein, breaks new ground here with material I found shocking.
In a long, carefully documented essay, Wasserstein (who's now at the University of Chicago), cites Arendt's scandalous use of quotes from anti-Semitic and Nazi "authorities" on Jews in her Totalitarianism book.
Wasserstein concludes that her use of these sources was "more than a methodological error: it was symptomatic of a perverse world-view contaminated by over-exposure to the discourse of collective contempt and stigmatization that formed the object of her study"—that object being anti-Semitism. In other words, he contends, Arendt internalized the values of the anti-Semitic literature she read in her study of anti-Semitism, at least to a certain extent. Wasserstein's conjecture will reignite the debate over Arendt's contemptuous remarks on certain Jews who were victims of Hitler in her Eichmann book and in her letters….”
http://www.slate.com/id/2234010/pagenum/all/
There is more; and one needs to address Wasserstein’s thesis and not attack Rosenbaum.
Well, perhaps "to ban" Heidegger won't be such a bad idea. It will excite the curiosity of many, and unless you burn all his books, perhaps more people will actually read "the last philosopher". Who precisely is, as Linker points out, the best after Hegel and unparalleled amongst 20th century philosophers
On Heidegger and Nazism, if his 1933-34 blindness is ununderstandable and unforgiveable (and there is nothing more to say about it), one should remember that the most accurate critique of Nazism, the sharpest denounciation of its aphilosophical nature was made precisely by Heidegger. As soon as 1936.
But for us contemporary Westerners to completely understand that critique also means to look ... view full comment
Well, perhaps "to ban" Heidegger won't be such a bad idea. It will excite the curiosity of many, and unless you burn all his books, perhaps more people will actually read "the last philosopher". Who precisely is, as Linker points out, the best after Hegel and unparalleled amongst 20th century philosophers
On Heidegger and Nazism, if his 1933-34 blindness is ununderstandable and unforgiveable (and there is nothing more to say about it), one should remember that the most accurate critique of Nazism, the sharpest denounciation of its aphilosophical nature was made precisely by Heidegger. As soon as 1936.
But for us contemporary Westerners to completely understand that critique also means to look deep into ourselves and recognize our captivity by technology... But that's another discussion.
"political authenticity"
gw:
What in the world can it mean to be "authentic" if, in the end, you die and can't take it with you? For billions of years there is the nothingness of "before birth" and "after death". The infinitesimally tiny speck that encompasses the 70 odd years between is truly a cosmological insignificance we will never find words for.
We become. We be. We die. Why? We don't know.
It is the psychological horror embedded in the brute facticity of that that prompts so many to embrace things like Nazis. They give us Meaning. They anchor us to Neccessity.
An illusion, sure. But desperate revelations call for desparate antidotes.
Because we die life means nothing. And because we die ... view full comment
"political authenticity"
gw:
What in the world can it mean to be "authentic" if, in the end, you die and can't take it with you? For billions of years there is the nothingness of "before birth" and "after death". The infinitesimally tiny speck that encompasses the 70 odd years between is truly a cosmological insignificance we will never find words for.
We become. We be. We die. Why? We don't know.
It is the psychological horror embedded in the brute facticity of that that prompts so many to embrace things like Nazis. They give us Meaning. They anchor us to Neccessity.
An illusion, sure. But desperate revelations call for desparate antidotes.
Because we die life means nothing. And because we die life means everything. How many fools [other than Heidegger and Hitler] have lived their lives trying to reconcile it somehow.
Oblivion is always the answer, no matter the question.
george walton
j
Leaving George’s insipid nonsense aside, the merit of luispc comments is that he has obviously read and studied Heidegger.
Still, he tends to exaggerate a little:
“Well, perhaps "to ban" Heidegger won't be such a bad idea. It will excite the curiosity of many, and unless you burn all his books, perhaps more people will actually read "the last philosopher". Who precisely is, as Linker points out, the best after Hegel and unparalleled amongst 20th century philosophers.”
There won’t be a ban on Heidegger precisely because people don’t care enough about him either to embrace his philosophy or to ban it. These are not days when people are ready to die for ‘a little knowledge.”
“On ... view full comment
Leaving George’s insipid nonsense aside, the merit of luispc comments is that he has obviously read and studied Heidegger.
Still, he tends to exaggerate a little:
“Well, perhaps "to ban" Heidegger won't be such a bad idea. It will excite the curiosity of many, and unless you burn all his books, perhaps more people will actually read "the last philosopher". Who precisely is, as Linker points out, the best after Hegel and unparalleled amongst 20th century philosophers.”
There won’t be a ban on Heidegger precisely because people don’t care enough about him either to embrace his philosophy or to ban it. These are not days when people are ready to die for ‘a little knowledge.”
“On Heidegger and Nazism, if his 1933-34 blindness is ununderstandable and unforgiveable (and there is nothing more to say about it),”
Why is there nothing more to say about it? This comment is made out of fear and not out of a desire to find out the truth about this “last philosopher.”
“…one should remember that the most accurate critique of Nazism, the sharpest denounciation of its aphilosophical nature was made precisely by Heidegger. As soon as 1936.”
This isn’t even remotely accurate. The denunciation of technology is a denunciation of Western Civilization and not just of National Socialism. Heidegger never explained why it was the Nazis that created factories of death and not the other Western countries.
“But for us contemporary Westerners to completely understand that critique also means to look deep into ourselves and recognize our captivity by technology... But that's another discussion.”
No, this is the discussion. This is an implied and tawdry comparison of the West (look deep into ourselves) to the Nazi regime.
If this isn’t what Luis meant, he should explain himself.
Finally, on the question of saving what is true in Heidegger’s philosophy and discarding the rest, this is difficult to do in a mode of thought that sees itself as holistic and where each element or aspect of his system is intricately related to the whole.
The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory. The concept of Verworfen-sein (the "thrown-ness" in which you find yourself in an alien environment) has been important for various people from Sartre and Camus to American authors such as Richard Wright, who saw the existential "crisis" as having a visceral and not only a social reality for blacks.
That sai ... view full comment
The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory. The concept of Verworfen-sein (the "thrown-ness" in which you find yourself in an alien environment) has been important for various people from Sartre and Camus to American authors such as Richard Wright, who saw the existential "crisis" as having a visceral and not only a social reality for blacks.
That said, there are a number of elements of Being and Time that can't be glossed over, and the way in which "Entschlossenheit" (decisiveness) is elevated as a value that paralells the Nazi movement and its attitude to strategic and political issues -- don't overthink it, just do it! -- is ominous. Other key terms such as "Wagnis" (risk/wager) and "Geschlecht" (race) go to create the same kind of overlap with National Socialist ideology.
Removing Heidegger would nevertheless have the primary effect of distorting modern intellectual history in order to make people feel comfortable and smugly superior. They weren't around to fight fascism and Nazism but by god they are going to wrench Heidegger out of those literature and philosophy courses!
I think Dominick LaCapra in Representing the Holocaust makes the best case for seeing an open and process-oriented dynamic of questioning --questions at all levels of existence -- in Being and Time as the most important reason for not folding that work into the implications of its vague and ominous terminology.
ironyroad
“The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory. The concept of Verworfen-sein (the "thrown-ness" in which you find yourself in an alien environment) has been important for various people from Sartre and Camus to American authors such as Richard Wright, who saw the existential "crisis" as having a visceral and not only a social reality for ... view full comment
ironyroad
“The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory. The concept of Verworfen-sein (the "thrown-ness" in which you find yourself in an alien environment) has been important for various people from Sartre and Camus to American authors such as Richard Wright, who saw the existential "crisis" as having a visceral and not only a social reality for blacks.”
There is truth in what you say from a popular culture point of view. However, your view is no compliment to Heidegger or Heideggerians. Two brief reasons:
First, the existentialism of Sartre (I am not sure that Camus was an existentialist) is very different from that of Heidegger.
Then there is the thorny issue of the naturalization of the concept by aligning it with that of oppressed people. The best writers on alienation didn’t see it as a socio-political issue but as an ontological one.
Your view of the parallels of some Heideggerian concepts to that of the Nazis is also on target.
And so is the following:
“Removing Heidegger would nevertheless have the primary effect of distorting modern intellectual history in order to make people feel comfortable and smugly superior.”
I am not sure the scholars who write about Heidegger’s Nazism want to deny his standing as an important 20th c philosopher. Like Marx he will live on willy-nilly in the history of thought.
However, there is this difference, while with Marx you can remove certain of his ideas and concepts and treat them in isolation, I don’t believe you can do that with Heidegger. Abstracting from his thought the good ideas from the rest of his philosophy, or inversely, cutting out the notions compromised or tainted with Nazi ideology, will do irreparable damage to Heidegger as a systematic thinker.
For better or worse, you have to either accept or reject his philosophy as a whole.
You yourself hint at this in your final paragraph when you describe his thought as “an open and process-oriented dynamic of questioning --questions at all levels of existence…”
However, how can you deduct from this process of ‘dynamic questioning’ “its vague and ominous terminology?”
Hey Jackson,
Captitivity by technology means captitivity by a Weltbild shaped after our own pretension to methodically know, ending up creating our own "truths" and nesting in inauthenticity. It endures and damages any possibility of true knowledge of ourselves. A knowledge that would pass by something we totally refuse: openess to Being, in the first instance, openess to its very question.
That was true for Nazis and is true for our contemporary age. Of course, I'm not equating the moral repugnancy of Nazism with anything else. That would be wrong, as well as offensive.
Hey Jackson,
Captitivity by technology means captitivity by a Weltbild shaped after our own pretension to methodically know, ending up creating our own "truths" and nesting in inauthenticity. It endures and damages any possibility of true knowledge of ourselves. A knowledge that would pass by something we totally refuse: openess to Being, in the first instance, openess to its very question.
That was true for Nazis and is true for our contemporary age. Of course, I'm not equating the moral repugnancy of Nazism with anything else. That would be wrong, as well as offensive.
Herr Professor Irony:
The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory.
george [the clown of philosophers]:
How can we imagine ourselves to be "foreigners" residing inside of something we are inherently a part of? Instead, we haven't a clue as to why we exist...or why the universe exist. Let alone if there is a teleological component we are, in turn, not privy t ... view full comment
Herr Professor Irony:
The value of Heidegger's writings for many is drawn from the set of ideas that we have come to call existentialism ("Existenzphilosophie"), an aspect of which is that one is conscious of being a "foreigner" in the universe, and that human identity and belonging are not inherited as a natural right so much as won out of chaos and the shadow of pre-lived lives like a conquered territory.
george [the clown of philosophers]:
How can we imagine ourselves to be "foreigners" residing inside of something we are inherently a part of? Instead, we haven't a clue as to why we exist...or why the universe exist. Let alone if there is a teleological component we are, in turn, not privy to. We make that stuff up as we go along.
Instead, we are "thrown" at birth...adventitiously, fortuitously, serendiptitously... into a cultural and historical stew whereby for years and years we will be brainwashed by others to internalize a sense of "identity"; a prefabricated sense of "self" that many still take literally to the grave with them.
For example, kids being raised in Israel now will grow to view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a very different way from kids being raised in Gaza.
The role of philosophy then is to assess how, once it's acknowledged, we can go about assessing something like this in the most rational manner.
And the existentialist [at least this one] then suggests in turn there is no assessment that can ever be said to encompass the most rational perspective. That's a very dangerous illusion instead.
Well, more dangerous for some, than others.
Then what?
What then, in other words. Where will the language of philosophy take or not take us once we own up its impotence in resolving that which is most important of all to us: where "is" ends and "ought" begins.
What Kant called "deontology". And what Hitler called, among other things, the "final solution".
What is our "duty" as citizens?
Do you know?
I know this: It is not to live "authentically". That's just another dangerous lie post-modern philosophers toss around before they too are swallowed up in the abyss that is oblivion.
And that's no lie, right?
Or it doesn't seem to be.
george walton
d/a/j
As usual, loony tunes post a comment not because he knows anything about linguistic, but because he is lonely and has no one to talk to.
He gets up at 4 am to post his nonsense which add nothing to the discussion.
George thinks that because he uses the word philosophy a number of times he has said something meaningful.
The guy is deluded.
As usual, loony tunes post a comment not because he knows anything about linguistic, but because he is lonely and has no one to talk to.
He gets up at 4 am to post his nonsense which add nothing to the discussion.
George thinks that because he uses the word philosophy a number of times he has said something meaningful.
The guy is deluded.
luispc
Hey Jackson,
"Captitivity by technology means captitivity by a Weltbild shaped after our own pretension to methodically know, ending up creating our own "truths" and nesting in inauthenticity. It endures and damages any possibility of true knowledge of ourselves. A knowledge that would pass by something we totally refuse: openess to Being, in the first instance, openess to its very question."
Captivity by technology? This is Hedeggo talk. It's also an empirical claim which isn't a fact.
Can there be science without technology? Which scientific knowledge should we give up? Physics, Genetics, or perhaps medicine?
"That was true for Nazis and is true for our contemporary age. Of cours ... view full comment
luispc
Hey Jackson,
"Captitivity by technology means captitivity by a Weltbild shaped after our own pretension to methodically know, ending up creating our own "truths" and nesting in inauthenticity. It endures and damages any possibility of true knowledge of ourselves. A knowledge that would pass by something we totally refuse: openess to Being, in the first instance, openess to its very question."
Captivity by technology? This is Hedeggo talk. It's also an empirical claim which isn't a fact.
Can there be science without technology? Which scientific knowledge should we give up? Physics, Genetics, or perhaps medicine?
"That was true for Nazis and is true for our contemporary age. Of course, I'm not equating the moral repugnancy of Nazism with anything else. That would be wrong, as well as offensive."
This is historically questionable since the Nazis did prefer pure country life sans technology as an ideal to urban and technological existence as an ideal.
You're right. But I'm not talking about technology in the strict sense of technological means. I'm talking about technology as something that frames the mind, becoming the place where one thinks, where one finds good and evil.
For instance, the Nazi man is a technological man since his (pseudo)scientific Weltbild centred on racial-darwinism is the place where he finds good and evil, from which he acts. The Smithian man is a technological man since his (pseudo)scientific Weltbild centred on efficiency is the place where he finds good and evil, etc., etc.
In these cases as in others (one could refer the Marxist-Leninist man as well) what stands behind the captivity is the pretension to build the ... view full comment
You're right. But I'm not talking about technology in the strict sense of technological means. I'm talking about technology as something that frames the mind, becoming the place where one thinks, where one finds good and evil.
For instance, the Nazi man is a technological man since his (pseudo)scientific Weltbild centred on racial-darwinism is the place where he finds good and evil, from which he acts. The Smithian man is a technological man since his (pseudo)scientific Weltbild centred on efficiency is the place where he finds good and evil, etc., etc.
In these cases as in others (one could refer the Marxist-Leninist man as well) what stands behind the captivity is the pretension to build the world after one's demiurgical reason, to be the author of all one's truths. Cogito ergo sum.
What about the Heideggerian man? Where does he find good and evil? In the technology of Being and being?
Are you sure we are not playing with words and concepts?
What about the Heideggerian man? Where does he find good and evil? In the technology of Being and being?
Are you sure we are not playing with words and concepts?
JD, I agree that there's a difference -- if I'm understanding you correctly -- between a "popular" understanding of existentialist philosophy and a more professional philosophical evaluation of it. I'd make the point, however, that EP (I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence" that's there in the German term) has had more effect on fiction, drama, and film in the 20th century than any almost any other intellectual or philosophical movement (you could make a case for marxism but I really find it difficult to see how popular forms -- as opposed to academic thought -- have been influenced by it as much).
For example, Sartre's admiration for J ... view full comment
JD, I agree that there's a difference -- if I'm understanding you correctly -- between a "popular" understanding of existentialist philosophy and a more professional philosophical evaluation of it. I'd make the point, however, that EP (I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence" that's there in the German term) has had more effect on fiction, drama, and film in the 20th century than any almost any other intellectual or philosophical movement (you could make a case for marxism but I really find it difficult to see how popular forms -- as opposed to academic thought -- have been influenced by it as much).
For example, Sartre's admiration for John Dos Passos's U.S.A. trilogy (sadly ignored today) was because he thought that Dos Passos succeeded in a more substantial and vivid way, as a novelist, in grasping and expressing the issues of alienation of the self and the danger of pre-conceived notions of the universe than a philosopher could.
Precisely because it calls upon the individual to grasp that existence is a kind of empty but potential grounding, and that knowledge is not only what comes marked by the approval of the outside world, it reflected the disappearance of religious and political bromides that were remnants of an earlier time. The experience of the 20th century -- genocide, war on an increasing scale but also urban anonymity/freedom and the dissolution of old empires and old conventions -- is part of the reason why there was (at least for many decades) a popular resonance for writers who explored or used the philosophy of existence.
" I'd make the point, however, that EP (I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence" that's there in the German term) has had more effect on fiction, drama, and film in the 20th century than any almost any other intellectual or philosophical movement (you could make a case for marxism but I really find it difficult to see how popular forms -- as opposed to academic thought -- have been influenced by it as much)."
I agree with this, Irony.
I liked the Dos Passos trilogy, btw.
Sartre was also a great admirer of Faulkner the writer, but hated his metaphysics. This is because Faulkner was influenced also by Henri Bergson who also had a huge influen ... view full comment
" I'd make the point, however, that EP (I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence" that's there in the German term) has had more effect on fiction, drama, and film in the 20th century than any almost any other intellectual or philosophical movement (you could make a case for marxism but I really find it difficult to see how popular forms -- as opposed to academic thought -- have been influenced by it as much)."
I agree with this, Irony.
I liked the Dos Passos trilogy, btw.
Sartre was also a great admirer of Faulkner the writer, but hated his metaphysics. This is because Faulkner was influenced also by Henri Bergson who also had a huge influence on 20th writing.
On the other hand existentialist fiction seldom came in pure form but often mixed in (or struggled with) with other modes of thought, be it Marxism, religious thought be it Christian or in the case of Kafka Jewish, or Romanticism.
We also shouldn't forget the influence of aestheticism in the 20th c which had little to do with existentialism. I am thinking here of Joyce or Beckett and of course Proust.
On the other hand existentialist fiction seldom came in pure form but often mixed in (or struggled with) with other modes of thought, be it Marxism, religious thought be it Christian or in the case of Kafka Jewish, or Romanticism.
We also shouldn't forget the influence of aestheticism in the 20th c which had little to do with existentialism. I am thinking here of Joyce or Beckett and of course Proust.
"What about the Heideggerian man? Where does he find good and evil? In the technology of Being and being?"
There isn't a "substantive" Heideggerian metaphysics. There couldn't be before a thinker that thought of himself as one of "a destituted time".
Heidegger's thought is purely "structural", so to speak. What he apprehends is the structure of Dasein. Not a substance that corresponds to it, to true humanity. That substance can only come from Being itself, which is silent or absent in Heidegger's thought ... and in Heidegger's time.
"What about the Heideggerian man? Where does he find good and evil? In the technology of Being and being?"
There isn't a "substantive" Heideggerian metaphysics. There couldn't be before a thinker that thought of himself as one of "a destituted time".
Heidegger's thought is purely "structural", so to speak. What he apprehends is the structure of Dasein. Not a substance that corresponds to it, to true humanity. That substance can only come from Being itself, which is silent or absent in Heidegger's thought ... and in Heidegger's time.
Yes, I know. Heidegger man is a mystery, a sort of holy ghost of a philosopher (excuse me thinker) who consumes no nourishment and uses no objects since that would reveal his substance; neither does he use numbers his language is indirect, ( a kind of tetragrammaton), lest he too be numbered and named.
Yet he is the very personification of verbosity, and of myth.
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?
Yes, I know. Heidegger man is a mystery, a sort of holy ghost of a philosopher (excuse me thinker) who consumes no nourishment and uses no objects since that would reveal his substance; neither does he use numbers his language is indirect, ( a kind of tetragrammaton), lest he too be numbered and named.
Yet he is the very personification of verbosity, and of myth.
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?
luis:
....I'm not talking about technology in the strict sense of technological means. I'm talking about technology as something that frames the mind, becoming the place where one thinks, where one finds good and evil.
gw:
Language is a technology. It is a technique we acquire from others as children in order to frame the world around us so as to distinguish...culturally, historically, experientially...good from evil.
The difficulties arise however when children become adults and figure out how, in many crucial respects, cultures vastly at odds come up with vastly at odds moral and political frameworks.
Then what? What then? How is philosophy [moral and political] used to whittle down the counte ... view full comment
luis:
....I'm not talking about technology in the strict sense of technological means. I'm talking about technology as something that frames the mind, becoming the place where one thinks, where one finds good and evil.
gw:
Language is a technology. It is a technique we acquire from others as children in order to frame the world around us so as to distinguish...culturally, historically, experientially...good from evil.
The difficulties arise however when children become adults and figure out how, in many crucial respects, cultures vastly at odds come up with vastly at odds moral and political frameworks.
Then what? What then? How is philosophy [moral and political] used to whittle down the countervailing relationships between "is" and "ought" in order to acquire the most reasonal assessment?
Some keep wiggling around this crucial distinction however because they can't bring yourselves to own up to the futility of it.
Some really do believe they are indeed the author of their own Truths. That Right and Wrong are not only accessible and assessable, but have beed accessed and assessed...truthfully...by them.
Otherwise "I" starts to wobble considerably more than their psychological defense mechanisms can accommodate for.
george walton
d/a/j
irony:
I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence"
gw:
And what might that be?
Here there is the "analytic" approach and the "continental" rendition. The former tries to analyze the nature existence into, uh, existence; and the latter snickers in rebuttal.
The former tends to eschew phenomonology because it does not fit well into the formal logic of "realism". The latter, while never succumbing to solipsism, of course, insists that existence is inseparable from the actual empirical experience of, for example, living our lives?
See, this is how Will Durant's "epistemologists" project. Like Irony above. Above all else it is important to sound like ... view full comment
irony:
I dislike "existentialism" because I think it removes the clarity of "philosophy of existence"
gw:
And what might that be?
Here there is the "analytic" approach and the "continental" rendition. The former tries to analyze the nature existence into, uh, existence; and the latter snickers in rebuttal.
The former tends to eschew phenomonology because it does not fit well into the formal logic of "realism". The latter, while never succumbing to solipsism, of course, insists that existence is inseparable from the actual empirical experience of, for example, living our lives?
See, this is how Will Durant's "epistemologists" project. Like Irony above. Above all else it is important to sound like a philosopher. Like Heidegger, for instance.
To wit:
"Precisely because it calls upon the individual to grasp that existence is a kind of empty but potential grounding, and that knowledge is not only what comes marked by the approval of the outside world, it reflected the disappearance of religious and political bromides that were remnants of an earlier time."
george:
Deep man deep. But what does it mean?
Well, let's ask him? "What does that mean, Irony?" Ground these abstractions in, say, a discussion of Nazis and intellectuals.
george walton
d/a/j
"What he apprehends is the structure of Dasein."
gw:
What he approaches [maybe] is an analytic framework that may or may not be helpful in grasping the actual phenomenon of existing itself.
This just takes us back to Rene Descartes and the problem of dualism. What is most profoundly problematic of all is "mind". Is it just mindful matter...or more. Is it connected to God [ontology, teleology] or to the brute naked "facticity" of an essentially absurd and meaningless world.
Does anyone dare to suggest that Heidegger's Being...trapped in the Space and Time of ceaseless becoming like the rest of us...is the last word on this?
Alas, we will all be floating around the universe again as star stuff so ... view full comment
"What he apprehends is the structure of Dasein."
gw:
What he approaches [maybe] is an analytic framework that may or may not be helpful in grasping the actual phenomenon of existing itself.
This just takes us back to Rene Descartes and the problem of dualism. What is most profoundly problematic of all is "mind". Is it just mindful matter...or more. Is it connected to God [ontology, teleology] or to the brute naked "facticity" of an essentially absurd and meaningless world.
Does anyone dare to suggest that Heidegger's Being...trapped in the Space and Time of ceaseless becoming like the rest of us...is the last word on this?
Alas, we will all be floating around the universe again as star stuff soon enough.
So, let's all hope for the best, and agree to get together, oh, a million years from now and discuss it again. At, say, the TNR offices in Washington? JD, get the key from Marty, okay? ; o )
george walton
d/a/j
JD: "On the other hand existentialist fiction seldom came in pure form but often mixed in (or struggled with) with other modes of thought, be it Marxism, religious thought be it Christian or in the case of Kafka Jewish, or Romanticism."
Marxism is the oddest damn thing. It was very difficult to write the socialist-realist novel, as the Soviet cultural bureaucracy found out, because to make the hero/protagonist a positive and exemplary figure was in almost all cases to offer a character who bored the socks off any half-way intelligent reader above the age of 6. The negative is so much more interesting.
The marxist novels that worked were often the stories by ex-communists such as Arthur Koes ... view full comment
JD: "On the other hand existentialist fiction seldom came in pure form but often mixed in (or struggled with) with other modes of thought, be it Marxism, religious thought be it Christian or in the case of Kafka Jewish, or Romanticism."
Marxism is the oddest damn thing. It was very difficult to write the socialist-realist novel, as the Soviet cultural bureaucracy found out, because to make the hero/protagonist a positive and exemplary figure was in almost all cases to offer a character who bored the socks off any half-way intelligent reader above the age of 6. The negative is so much more interesting.
The marxist novels that worked were often the stories by ex-communists such as Arthur Koestler and Ralph Ellison who tended to treat the Party to the same analysis that the Party had, in its turn, directed at bourgeois institutions such as authors. But the loneliness that followed rejection of/by even the most implacable and corrupt apparatus was difficult to bear. Indeed, with the CP demanding that only it have the authority to determine what the appropriate presuppositions for knowledge might be, the existentialist, whatever he was, could only be the opposite of a functionary in a communist state. Except perhaps for those with some problematic identity (e.g. Jewish) that kept them from being complete ciphers.
I think Malraux's Man's Estate is one of the only marxist novels I'm familiar with that captures something of a more collective feeling of struggle. There in 1927 one could imagine the communists as potentially the liberators of both the oppressed Chinese masses and the alienated intellectual.
Camus rejected the existentialist label, but I think The Fall is a remarkable piece of work, and a radical study of self-ness and otherness that seems to embody some of the Heideggerian concepts (the uncanny, Being-toward-death) most forcefully. I almost want to go to Amsterdam right now and find a bar.
"Camus rejected the existentialist label, but I think The Fall is a remarkable piece of work, and a radical study of self-ness and otherness that seems to embody some of the Heideggerian concepts (the uncanny, Being-toward-death) most forcefully. I almost want to go to Amsterdam right now and find a bar."
yes, I agree that The fall is Camus' masterwork.
One can of course read Heidegger into it, but I don't think Camus ever read him.
He wrote eloquently about Nietzsche and Ortega Y Gasset but I found no mention of Heidegger in his work. Perhaps I missed it, though.
I like what you wrote about Communist fiction. On the whole it wasn't successful except perhaps for a few short stories by Babel. ... view full comment
"Camus rejected the existentialist label, but I think The Fall is a remarkable piece of work, and a radical study of self-ness and otherness that seems to embody some of the Heideggerian concepts (the uncanny, Being-toward-death) most forcefully. I almost want to go to Amsterdam right now and find a bar."
yes, I agree that The fall is Camus' masterwork.
One can of course read Heidegger into it, but I don't think Camus ever read him.
He wrote eloquently about Nietzsche and Ortega Y Gasset but I found no mention of Heidegger in his work. Perhaps I missed it, though.
I like what you wrote about Communist fiction. On the whole it wasn't successful except perhaps for a few short stories by Babel. I made the mistake of reading Sholokhov at one time.
As for the mixture of existentialism and Marxism I guess I was mostly thinking of writers like Jean Genet and of films like “The Bicycle Thief.”
ire:
Marxism is the oddest damn thing.
gw:
No odder than the industrial revolution out of which it professed to synchronize.
Though, admittedly, folks like Rand learned their lesson from Marx. Make the Good Guys as preposterous as the Bad Guys. Or at the very least make them more believable than mere abstractoids.
Self-NESS. Camus: the part played by the individual. Sartre: the part played by the history of the rest of us.
Heidegger: Beingness toward deathness by way of becominglessandlessness.
Hmm...
Where does Sarah Palin and Doug Hoffman fit into all this?
Sigh. Where's Martin when you need him, eh?
; o )
gw
ire:
Marxism is the oddest damn thing.
gw:
No odder than the industrial revolution out of which it professed to synchronize.
Though, admittedly, folks like Rand learned their lesson from Marx. Make the Good Guys as preposterous as the Bad Guys. Or at the very least make them more believable than mere abstractoids.
Self-NESS. Camus: the part played by the individual. Sartre: the part played by the history of the rest of us.
Heidegger: Beingness toward deathness by way of becominglessandlessness.
Hmm...
Where does Sarah Palin and Doug Hoffman fit into all this?
Sigh. Where's Martin when you need him, eh?
; o )
gw
"Yet he is the very personification of (...) myth.
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?"
Instead of challenging Heidegger, let's dare to challenge ourselves, inverting your question! Can our most fundamental beliefs - those that structure our moral universe - be justified?
Isn't your question determined by a conception of human rationality which is a myth, an illusion, that precisely ends up leaving us captive?
"Yet he is the very personification of (...) myth.
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?"
Instead of challenging Heidegger, let's dare to challenge ourselves, inverting your question! Can our most fundamental beliefs - those that structure our moral universe - be justified?
Isn't your question determined by a conception of human rationality which is a myth, an illusion, that precisely ends up leaving us captive?
"Some really do believe they are indeed the author of their own Truths. That Right and Wrong are not only accessible and assessable, but have beed accessed and assessed...truthfully...by them."
Let them live in that illusion if that's what they believe. But it's still an illusion, an undefensible answer to the fundamental question we have to ask today: "why we are ourselves rather than others?"
"Some really do believe they are indeed the author of their own Truths. That Right and Wrong are not only accessible and assessable, but have beed accessed and assessed...truthfully...by them."
Let them live in that illusion if that's what they believe. But it's still an illusion, an undefensible answer to the fundamental question we have to ask today: "why we are ourselves rather than others?"
luis:
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?"
george:
Notice how this analysis really isn't about anything at all. Which, perhaps, is his point. Truth and falsehood revolve solely around the definitions we give to the words used to do the analyzing----of other words.
Instead, let someone give us an actual "Heideggerian proposition" about something that eventually gets around to an empirical relationship between human thought, human ... view full comment
luis:
The question all this begs is how Heidegger man distinguishes the true from the false since to do so would imply the recognition of some kind of logical system (the technology of truth and untruth). Can a Heideggerian proposition be falsified, or is its mere mention a sign of misapprehension of being?"
george:
Notice how this analysis really isn't about anything at all. Which, perhaps, is his point. Truth and falsehood revolve solely around the definitions we give to the words used to do the analyzing----of other words.
Instead, let someone give us an actual "Heideggerian proposition" about something that eventually gets around to an empirical relationship between human thought, human emotion and human behavior. When? Where? How? Name the context, as Rand might say.
In other words, falsify what? Misapprehend "being" in what particular existential circumstance?
luis:
Instead of challenging Heidegger, let's dare to challenge ourselves, inverting your question! Can our most fundamental beliefs - those that structure our moral universe - be justified?
george:
Challenging Heidegger [and yourself] regarding what? Nazis? Dasein? Being and death?....Abortion? capital punishment? Israel?
Again, someone must proffer us one of their own "fundamental beliefs" about human behavior. How is it "structured"? How is it "justified"?
luis:
Isn't your question determined by a conception of human rationality which is a myth, an illusion, that precisely ends up leaving us captive?
george:
Yes, here the challenge is to avoid this route. To wit: Give us a conception of human rationality that does not eventualy get tied into knots by its own epistemological assumptions about, right, wrong, good, evil. This and the profound limitations of philosophical language.
The illusion in other words that this can be known essentially, objectively, universally. Or formally.
Personally, however, I'm always compelled to expose their illusions because these illusions are the most dangerous of all intellectual contraptions. Aside, perhaps, from nihilism. In the wrong mind.
Fortunately, I am now cynical enough to recognize the sheer futility of snagging more than a couple of minds here or there. Otherwise, the despair might be overwhelming. As it was when I was much younger. In, for example, Vietnam.
george walton
d/a/j
"Instead of challenging Heidegger, let's dare to challenge ourselves,"
Luis, this is a moral psychologist's answer, not a philosophical one.
" inverting your question! Can our most fundamental beliefs - those that structure our moral universe - be justified?"
This is a question begging inversion.
In any case, in what way is the condemnation of murder not justified?
"Instead of challenging Heidegger, let's dare to challenge ourselves,"
Luis, this is a moral psychologist's answer, not a philosophical one.
" inverting your question! Can our most fundamental beliefs - those that structure our moral universe - be justified?"
This is a question begging inversion.
In any case, in what way is the condemnation of murder not justified?
Looks like lonely loony george is trying to take over this thread.
Looks like lonely loony george is trying to take over this thread.
This thread has been a pleasure to read, (with the exception of the eructations of the self-described "philosopher" who doesn't know his Dasein from a hole in the ground).
Re: studying Heidegger's philosophy, the legal concept of "fruit of a poisoned tree" came to mind. How can his philosophy ever be studied out of the context of his despicable politics and that it was the product of a despicable man?
I can understand why Karl Popper said "I appeal to the philosophers of all countries to unite and never again mention Heidegger or talk to another philosopher who defends Heidegger. This man was a devil. I mean, he behaved like a devil to his beloved teacher Husserl, and he has a devilish in ... view full comment
This thread has been a pleasure to read, (with the exception of the eructations of the self-described "philosopher" who doesn't know his Dasein from a hole in the ground).
Re: studying Heidegger's philosophy, the legal concept of "fruit of a poisoned tree" came to mind. How can his philosophy ever be studied out of the context of his despicable politics and that it was the product of a despicable man?
I can understand why Karl Popper said "I appeal to the philosophers of all countries to unite and never again mention Heidegger or talk to another philosopher who defends Heidegger. This man was a devil. I mean, he behaved like a devil to his beloved teacher Husserl, and he has a devilish influence on Germany".
Yet, to understand Heidegger is not to condone him. And without understanding, how can we condemn?