For years, the Soviet Union has worked diligently and resourcefully in the byzantine vineyards of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, tightening its grip on the political processes in South Yemen by increasing its military and economic presence. Today the Soviets appear ready to attempt to reap the fruits of their labor: reunification of South and North Yemen and the consolidation and strengthening of Soviet influence in the volatile and strategic Arabian peninsula.
Three important events this year serve as early warning signals of Soviet intentions. They are the wildly misinterpreted emergence of Ali Nasser Muhammed as the top man in the PDRY, and the fall of controversial and radical president Abdul Fattah Ismail in April; Nasser Muhammed's subsequent cordial and lengthy reunification talks with North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) prime minister Abdul Aziz Abdulghani and his attempts at rapprochement with moderate Arabs; and the Soviet Union's opportunistic sale of arms to North Yemen, filling a vacuum left by the United States and the bumbling Saudi Arabians.
On April 21, in a sudden shake-up that stunned South Yemen's neighbors and confounded the US State Department, it was announced that Fattah Ismail had resigned for reasons of ill health. No one believed that story, but State Department experts saw this sudden change as a blow to reunification of the two Yemens, since Ismail reportedly was eager to move toward reunification and Nasser Muhammed was perceived as more cautious on the subject. The New York Times dutifully chimed in by reporting that Nasser Muhammed was more open to establishing friendly relationships with the West and with Saudi Arabia, and that he was more independent of the Soviets.
But there was more to the transfer of power in South Yemen than met the eye. Ismail first came to power in 1979, seven years after the Soviets signed a 10-year military agreement with South Yemen's then president Salim Ali Rubay. The Soviets then began their military build-up in earnest, increasing the number of advisers in South Yemen from 1,100 to 2,500 in a matter of months after Rubay was deposed in an Ismail-led, East German and Cuban-supported coup. The struggle between Rubay and Ismail, which culminated in Rubay's execution, centered on local, interparty issues. But the critical difference between the two leaders from the Soviet perspective was that Rubay favored rapprochement with the Saudis—a stance that did not sit well with the Soviet Union.
Although relations toward the Soviet Union were cemented under Ismail, the radical Marxist did not prove as malleable as the Soviets would have liked. Ismail consistently irritated and worried his Arab neighbors, first with his support of the Dhofar revolutionary group in Oman, then with his supportof leftist elements in North Yemen, which did not make things easy for the Soviets in their efforts to open a bridge to North Yemen. The coming of Ismail also marked the end of the PDRY's rapprochement efforts with Saudi Arabia, which further frightened the skittish Saudis.
Ismail's ouster can be traced directly to the competition between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia for favored status with North Yemen. In 1978 North Yemen, under the leadership of President Ahmed al-Gashmi, had excellent relations with Saudi Arabia and hopes of better relations with South Yemen, under the leadership of the moderate Rubay. All that changed when the radical Marxist Ismail came to power. North Yemen, threatened in its border war with the Ismail-led PDRY, still hoped for good relations and assistance from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis responded by asking the United States to send almost $400 million in military aid to North Yemen, including 12 F-5E aircraft, 64 M60 tanks, and related parts, technology, and equipment. This equipment eventually was delivered to North Yemen, but not before the Saudi Arabians had vacillated about sending additional aid. The Saudis wanted to help the Yemenis fend off the PDRY but at the same time did not want to strengthen North Yemen militarily. This vacillation, and the Saudis' unwillingness to pay the US for the airlifted equipment, proved to be their undoing, North Yemen, walking a tightrope between the big powers, opened discussions with the Soviet Union and requested military aid. The Soviets promptly (according to Yemeni analysts) delivered a number of SU 22 jets, Mig 21 fighters, as well as a variety of tanks.
The Soviet Union, at first fearful of the Saudi Arabian and US response to the border war, jumped at the opportunity for an opening to North Yemen. But Ismail persisted in his belligerent stance toward North Yemen and thus threatened the Soviets' new relationship with the YAR.
In effect, the Soviets gave active support to the down fall of Ismail and ended updoing what they always have done: sacrificing ideology to military ambition. The Soviets undermined and helped topple a Marxist regime to help further their own strategic interests. By promoting Nasser Muhammed to the PDRY leadership and by presenting him to the world as a moderate and reasonable politician, the Soviet Union has managed to accomplish two things: it has made the PDRY palatable to the rest of the Arab world, and thus has furthered the cause of Yemeni reunification.
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