A young Osama bin Laden first arrived in the region around 1980 to wage jihad against the Soviets; he would spend most of his adult life in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda leaders have, since the '80s, developed deep relationships with key Taliban commanders based along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and members of the Haqqani family. Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, has even married into a local tribe.
It is true that, before September 11, some Taliban leaders opposed bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan on the grounds that it was interfering with their quest for international recognition. And it is also true that Taliban foot soldiers today are fighting for any number of reasons--ranging from cash payments, to tribal opposition to the government, to a hatred of foreigners.
But, in recent years, Taliban leaders have drawn especially close to Al Qaeda. (There are basically two branches of the Taliban--Pakistani and Afghan--but both are currently headquartered in Pakistan, and they are quite a bit more interwoven than is commonly thought.) Today, at the leadership level, the Taliban and Al Qaeda function more or less as a single entity. The signs of this are everywhere. For instance, IED attacks in Afghanistan have increased dramatically since 2004. What happened? As a Taliban member told Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau of Newsweek, "The Arabs taught us how to make an IED by mixing nitrate fertilizer and diesel fuel and how to pack plastic explosives and to connect them to detonators and remote-control devices like mobile phones. We learned how to do this blindfolded so we could safely plant IEDs in the dark." Another explained that "Arab and Iraqi mujahedin began visiting us, transferring the latest IED technology and suicide-bomber tactics they had learned in the Iraqi resistance." Small numbers of Al Qaeda instructors embedded with much larger Taliban units have functioned something like U.S. Special Forces do--as trainers and force multipliers.
Meanwhile, the Taliban, like Al Qaeda, has tried to attack the West. According to Spanish prosecutors, the late and unlamented leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, dispatched suicide bombers on a botched mission to Barcelona in January 2008. Pakistani Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar confirmed this in August during a videotaped interview in which he said that those bombers "were under pledge to Baitullah Mehsud." The point is not that the Taliban is going to mount a widespread campaign of terrorism in the West--it isn't--but simply that the Taliban's approach to combat has increasingly merged with Al Qaeda's.
The Taliban has borrowed more than just violent techniques from bin Laden's group. The Pakistani Taliban has an active video-propaganda operation that mimics Al Qaeda's video wing. In fact, the output of the two is often interchangeable--indicating that Taliban and Al Qaeda operations are conducted jointly. Ben Venzke of IntelCenter, a government contractor that closely monitors jihadist propaganda, reports that "a growing number of Pakistani Taliban people are showing up in Al Qaeda productions."
One of the key leaders of the Afghan Taliban as it surged in strength in 2006 was Mullah Dadullah, a thuggish but effective commander who was quite upfront about his close links to Al Qaeda. "Osama bin Laden, thank God, is alive and in good health," he told CBS in December 2006. "We are in contact with his top aides and sharing plans and operations with each other." Dadullah would later claim that bin Laden himself had supervised a Taliban suicide operation targeting Dick Cheney during his visit to Afghanistan in February 2007.
This summer, Mustafa Abu Al Yazid, one of Al Qaeda's founders and a current member of its leadership council, described his group's rapport with the Taliban during an interview with Al Jazeera in Afghanistan. "We are on a good and strong relationship with them," he explained, "and we frequently meet them." He also said that his organization continues to regard Mullah Omar as the "Commander of the Faithful"--in effect acknowledging that the Taliban leader is Al Qaeda's religious guide, a position he has enjoyed for the past decade.
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COMMENTS (8)
Over and again lately we hear from the Joe Bidens in the media that there are only a tiny number of Al Qaeda members now operating in Afghanistan.
But starting with Zazi and hair-gate, Peter Bergen sets out to demonstrate to us they could not possibly be more wrong.
Well, before examining all his evidence let me take a wild guess here: Those already predisposed [say, politically...economically?] to believe Bergen's narrative are now fully prepared to accept as the gospel the dots he connects to one of what must now be more than just a handful of Whole Truths regarding What Is Really Going On In Afghanistan.
You can tell however that Bergen is intent on carefully choosing the dots to connect i ... view full comment
Over and again lately we hear from the Joe Bidens in the media that there are only a tiny number of Al Qaeda members now operating in Afghanistan.
But starting with Zazi and hair-gate, Peter Bergen sets out to demonstrate to us they could not possibly be more wrong.
Well, before examining all his evidence let me take a wild guess here: Those already predisposed [say, politically...economically?] to believe Bergen's narrative are now fully prepared to accept as the gospel the dots he connects to one of what must now be more than just a handful of Whole Truths regarding What Is Really Going On In Afghanistan.
You can tell however that Bergen is intent on carefully choosing the dots to connect in the manner in which he broaches bin Laden's role in Afghanistan circa the 1980s. He mentions not at all the role America played in allying itself with bin Laden and his ilk back then. And then abandoning Afghanistan to the religious nuts after the Soviets were driven out.
What's that got to do with anything today, right?
PG:
The point is not that the Taliban is going to mount a widespread campaign of terrorism in the West---it isn't---but simply that the Taliban's approach to combat has increasingly merged with Al Qaeda's.
george:
No, the point is that the Taliban has no intention of launching a widespread campaign of terrorism against the West. In particular, if there really are few Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan.
And The Taliban adopts the military tactics of Al Qaeda because like Al Qaeda, they are, in terms of access to sophisticated military hardware and technology, a gnat next to the T-Rex military capability of the West. Does Bergen honestly expect us to believe they would resort to suicide missions and IEDs if they had access to a sophisticated air force and army...to Predators and other drones launched by computer technology somewhere in North Carolina or Alabama?
Then Bergen goes off concocting the usual, "but wouldn't the Taliban, once back in power...."
Do what? Bergen brings out all the contacts he has accummulated between them and Al Qaeda and fits them all together into the fabric of reality he prefers. A carefully calibrated half a whole cloth narrative that will justify whatever he wants done about it.
Although, admittedly, he says, "it's impossible to know for sure." But like so many other such "analyses" in TNR, the bottom line remains exactly the same: Why take the chance?!!
As for the alternative base camps in Somalia or Yemen? Well, he insists, "there is scant evidence that any senior Al Qaeda leaders have relocated to either place".
Scant evidence when it doesn't suit your war plans but plenty of evidence when it does. Are folks like Bergen even self-conscious of how they work out these relationships as they "paint a picture" for the rest of us?
The picture being painted in Pakistan is, however, indeed far more complicated. And I'm with Biden here. But so much regarding how we should respond to that now will depend on how the current military campaign between the Pakistani government and the Taliban and Al Qaeda in South Wazirstan unfolds. Here especially though we come face to face with how little most of us really know about what is going behind the scenes in that part of the world. Why in the world then should you embrace Bergen's narrative other than as a way to bolster your own?
As for the web, "Q" and "most polls" in Afghanistan? Oh, please.
And everyone wants "security". But what exactly will be secured? And what really motivates those who tell you they want to help you achieve it? Oh, I forgot: The history of our involvment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that we're "the good guys". I mean just read the polls there. Uh, most of them.
So, what is really going on in Afghanistan? Damned if I know. But I suspect Colin Powell might have been a bit closer than Bergen when he brought this up recently with respect to the whole gigantic pork barrel project that has become the, "War on Terror":
Powell discussing his interview in GQ Magazine regarding a possible Terrorist Industrial Complex:
We're spending an enormous amount of money on homeland security — and I think we should spend whatever it takes — but I think we have to be careful that we don't get so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counterterrorist problem that we're essentially creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat pumped up. And so that would be the context of that comment, and I feel strongly about it — just as, many years ago, [U.S. President] General [Dwight] Eisenhower warned [PDF] about a Military-Industrial Complex. I just wanted to make a point: defend ourselves, screen ourselves, do everything we can to go after terrorists and defeat terrorism, because it is a threat, it is an enemy — but let's keep it in perspective. Let's keep it in context, because the United States has many needs. We have needs to deal with the poverty of some of our people, education, the environment. There are lots of things America needs to do, and we have to make sure we only spend that which is absolutely essential on our military, on our police forces, and on our [anti-]terrorist activities.
george:
Follow the fucking money.
But, yeah, I know. As with Iraq, NOW he brings it up!!!
george walton
d/a
Starting yesterday, the NY Times has a good 5-part series by David Rohde, a reporter of theirs kidnapped last November along with his translator and driver by his interview subject and held captive for 7 mos. until their escape. Perhaps Afghanistan lacks the internet, but he describes the tribal areas where they ended up as having good electricity and internet access where the captors could listen to American broadcasts and give him English language Pakistani newspapers.
My Afghan stepfather was raised in a family of diplomats. It's hard to believe, but in the '50s Kabul was a westernized, cosmopolitan city where women could wear skirts, heels and lipstick. And don't forget all the hippie ... view full comment
Starting yesterday, the NY Times has a good 5-part series by David Rohde, a reporter of theirs kidnapped last November along with his translator and driver by his interview subject and held captive for 7 mos. until their escape. Perhaps Afghanistan lacks the internet, but he describes the tribal areas where they ended up as having good electricity and internet access where the captors could listen to American broadcasts and give him English language Pakistani newspapers.
My Afghan stepfather was raised in a family of diplomats. It's hard to believe, but in the '50s Kabul was a westernized, cosmopolitan city where women could wear skirts, heels and lipstick. And don't forget all the hippie trekkers who went through there in the '60s, usu. on their way to Shangri-La (Kathmandu), receiving excellent hospitality along the way. It started going to hell in a handbasket in the mid '70s with a coup, then the death spiral began with the Soviet invasion.
A disturbing report by the typically well-informed Bergen. I think we can agree that the leadership of the Taliban has effectively meshed with AQ; that losing the nation-state platform of Afghanistan to them, crude as it is, would still be a major problem; and that the much more important Pakistan is probably unfixable with a Taliban-ruled state next door.
On the other hand, I think we can be pretty confident of our ability to prevent a Taliban takeover. But if securing Afghanistan means "defeating the Taliban", we can kiss our asses goodbye. I think it's entirely feasible to contain the Taliban and prevent them from taking over the state. We can also probably knock off their leadership with ... view full comment
A disturbing report by the typically well-informed Bergen. I think we can agree that the leadership of the Taliban has effectively meshed with AQ; that losing the nation-state platform of Afghanistan to them, crude as it is, would still be a major problem; and that the much more important Pakistan is probably unfixable with a Taliban-ruled state next door.
On the other hand, I think we can be pretty confident of our ability to prevent a Taliban takeover. But if securing Afghanistan means "defeating the Taliban", we can kiss our asses goodbye. I think it's entirely feasible to contain the Taliban and prevent them from taking over the state. We can also probably knock off their leadership with enough reliability to fundamentally change the equation. But to the extent that most rank-and-file "Taliban" are essentially the traditional tribal fighters of the Pashtun nation, they are no more going to be defeated in their tribal fastnesses by us than they have been by anyone else who has tried, and it's a pretty impressive list.
We need to be in for the long haul, which means for now being careful not to inflate expectations about what can be gained by dumping in a bunch more grunts, and placing a great deal of emphasis on building the sort of long-term relationships that produce real intelligence of the sort that can maximize our technological advantages. It's also important not to exaggerate the centrality of the camps--a seminar on explosives and tactics doesn't need hundreds of square miles of Afghan real estate to be effective, and visa-free travel between the US and, say, Hamburg or Londonistan still looks like a bigger threat to me. If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
So, I see the "Obama Bin Laden I know" has been corrected to the "Osama Bin Laden I know," in the About the Author section.
So, I see the "Obama Bin Laden I know" has been corrected to the "Osama Bin Laden I know," in the About the Author section.
Excellent post, RP, my sentiments exactly. Now, if we can just get POTUS to make a decision....
Excellent post, RP, my sentiments exactly. Now, if we can just get POTUS to make a decision....
Thanks, Butch. Now if we can just get the Tigers to find their offense...
I think O's playing this one about right now. He had to be disabused of his naieve "Iraq Bad/Afghanistan Good" campaign oversimplification, and it appears this has been done. I'd much rather he now use his famous intellect to make a good decision rather than just a quick one. After all, we've got more troops in Afghanistan now than we have ever had...
Thanks, Butch. Now if we can just get the Tigers to find their offense...
I think O's playing this one about right now. He had to be disabused of his naieve "Iraq Bad/Afghanistan Good" campaign oversimplification, and it appears this has been done. I'd much rather he now use his famous intellect to make a good decision rather than just a quick one. After all, we've got more troops in Afghanistan now than we have ever had...
If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
Amen to that, I am not sure how well we can secure Kabul, but if we can, and if we do turn it into something reasonably westernized that will have a pretty pernicious effect on the taliban maintaining discipline. The allure of bright lights big cities vs torch light mud huts.
If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
Amen to that, I am not sure how well we can secure Kabul, but if we can, and if we do turn it into something reasonably westernized that will have a pretty pernicious effect on the taliban maintaining discipline. The allure of bright lights big cities vs torch light mud huts.
"....and if we do turn Kabul into something reasonably westernized...."
gw:
Las Vegas, maybe. Bright lights and condoms. Comped.
g
"....and if we do turn Kabul into something reasonably westernized...."
gw:
Las Vegas, maybe. Bright lights and condoms. Comped.
g