On July 25, Najibullah Zazi, a lanky man in his mid-twenties, walked into the Beauty Supply Warehouse in Aurora, Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The visit was captured on a store video camera. Wearing a baseball cap and pushing a shopping cart, Zazi appeared to be just another suburban guy.
Of course, not many suburban guys buy six bottles of Clairoxide hair bleach, as Zazi did on this shopping trip--or return a month later to buy a dozen bottles of "Ms. K Liquid," a peroxide-based product. Aware that these were hardly the typical purchases of a heavily bearded, dark-haired young man, Zazi--who was born in Afghanistan and spent part of his childhood in Pakistan before moving to the United States at the age of 14--kibitzed easily with the counter staff, joking that he had to buy such large quantities of hair products because he "had a lot of girlfriends."
In fact, the government believes that Zazi, a onetime coffee-cart operator on Wall Street and shuttle-van driver at the Denver airport, was planning what could have been the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since September 11. Prior to his arrest last month, the FBI discovered pages of handwritten notes on his laptop detailing how to turn common, store-bought chemicals into bombs. If proven guilty, Zazi would be the first genuine Al Qaeda recruit discovered in the United States in the past few years.
The novel details of the case were sobering. Few Americans, after all, were expecting to be terrorized by an Al Qaeda agent wielding hair dye. But it was perhaps the least surprising fact about Zazi that was arguably the most consequential: where he is said to have trained.
In August 2008, prosecutors allege, Zazi traveled to Pakistan's tribal regions and studied explosives with Al Qaeda members. If that story sounds familiar, it should: Nearly every major jihadist plot against Western targets in the last two decades somehow leads back to Afghanistan or Pakistan. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was masterminded by Ramzi Yousef, who had trained in an Al Qaeda camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Ahmed Ressam, who plotted to blow up LAX airport in 1999, was trained in Al Qaeda's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan. Key operatives in the suicide attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000 trained in Afghanistan; so did all 19 September 11 hijackers. The leader of the 2002 Bali attack that killed more than 200 people, mostly Western tourists, was a veteran of the Afghan camps. The ringleader of the 2005 London subway bombing was trained by Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The British plotters who planned to blow up passenger planes leaving Heathrow in the summer of 2006 were taking direction from Pakistan; a July 25, 2006, e-mail from their Al Qaeda handler in that country, Rashid Rauf, urged them to "get a move on." If that attack had succeeded, as many as 1,500 would have died. The three men who, in 2007, were planning to attack Ramstein Air Base, a U.S. facility in Germany, had trained in Pakistan's tribal regions.
And yet, as President Obama weighs whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, the connection between the region and Al Qaeda has suddenly become a matter of hot dispute in Washington. We are told that September 11 was as much a product of plotting in Hamburg as in Afghanistan; that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are quite distinct groups, and that we can therefore defeat the former while tolerating the latter; that flushing jihadists out of one failing state will merely cause them to pop up in another anarchic corner of the globe; that, in the age of the Internet, denying terrorists a physical safe haven isn't all it's cracked up to be.
These arguments point toward one conclusion: The effort to secure Afghanistan is not a matter of vital U.S. interest. But those who make this case could not be more mistaken. Afghanistan and the areas of Pakistan that border it have always been the epicenter of the war on jihadist terrorism--and, at least for the foreseeable future, they will continue to be. Though it may be tempting to think otherwise, we cannot defeat Al Qaeda without securing Afghanistan.
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COMMENTS (8)
Over and again lately we hear from the Joe Bidens in the media that there are only a tiny number of Al Qaeda members now operating in Afghanistan.
But starting with Zazi and hair-gate, Peter Bergen sets out to demonstrate to us they could not possibly be more wrong.
Well, before examining all his evidence let me take a wild guess here: Those already predisposed [say, politically...economically?] to believe Bergen's narrative are now fully prepared to accept as the gospel the dots he connects to one of what must now be more than just a handful of Whole Truths regarding What Is Really Going On In Afghanistan.
You can tell however that Bergen is intent on carefully choosing the dots to connect i ... view full comment
Over and again lately we hear from the Joe Bidens in the media that there are only a tiny number of Al Qaeda members now operating in Afghanistan.
But starting with Zazi and hair-gate, Peter Bergen sets out to demonstrate to us they could not possibly be more wrong.
Well, before examining all his evidence let me take a wild guess here: Those already predisposed [say, politically...economically?] to believe Bergen's narrative are now fully prepared to accept as the gospel the dots he connects to one of what must now be more than just a handful of Whole Truths regarding What Is Really Going On In Afghanistan.
You can tell however that Bergen is intent on carefully choosing the dots to connect in the manner in which he broaches bin Laden's role in Afghanistan circa the 1980s. He mentions not at all the role America played in allying itself with bin Laden and his ilk back then. And then abandoning Afghanistan to the religious nuts after the Soviets were driven out.
What's that got to do with anything today, right?
PG:
The point is not that the Taliban is going to mount a widespread campaign of terrorism in the West---it isn't---but simply that the Taliban's approach to combat has increasingly merged with Al Qaeda's.
george:
No, the point is that the Taliban has no intention of launching a widespread campaign of terrorism against the West. In particular, if there really are few Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan.
And The Taliban adopts the military tactics of Al Qaeda because like Al Qaeda, they are, in terms of access to sophisticated military hardware and technology, a gnat next to the T-Rex military capability of the West. Does Bergen honestly expect us to believe they would resort to suicide missions and IEDs if they had access to a sophisticated air force and army...to Predators and other drones launched by computer technology somewhere in North Carolina or Alabama?
Then Bergen goes off concocting the usual, "but wouldn't the Taliban, once back in power...."
Do what? Bergen brings out all the contacts he has accummulated between them and Al Qaeda and fits them all together into the fabric of reality he prefers. A carefully calibrated half a whole cloth narrative that will justify whatever he wants done about it.
Although, admittedly, he says, "it's impossible to know for sure." But like so many other such "analyses" in TNR, the bottom line remains exactly the same: Why take the chance?!!
As for the alternative base camps in Somalia or Yemen? Well, he insists, "there is scant evidence that any senior Al Qaeda leaders have relocated to either place".
Scant evidence when it doesn't suit your war plans but plenty of evidence when it does. Are folks like Bergen even self-conscious of how they work out these relationships as they "paint a picture" for the rest of us?
The picture being painted in Pakistan is, however, indeed far more complicated. And I'm with Biden here. But so much regarding how we should respond to that now will depend on how the current military campaign between the Pakistani government and the Taliban and Al Qaeda in South Wazirstan unfolds. Here especially though we come face to face with how little most of us really know about what is going behind the scenes in that part of the world. Why in the world then should you embrace Bergen's narrative other than as a way to bolster your own?
As for the web, "Q" and "most polls" in Afghanistan? Oh, please.
And everyone wants "security". But what exactly will be secured? And what really motivates those who tell you they want to help you achieve it? Oh, I forgot: The history of our involvment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that we're "the good guys". I mean just read the polls there. Uh, most of them.
So, what is really going on in Afghanistan? Damned if I know. But I suspect Colin Powell might have been a bit closer than Bergen when he brought this up recently with respect to the whole gigantic pork barrel project that has become the, "War on Terror":
Powell discussing his interview in GQ Magazine regarding a possible Terrorist Industrial Complex:
We're spending an enormous amount of money on homeland security — and I think we should spend whatever it takes — but I think we have to be careful that we don't get so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counterterrorist problem that we're essentially creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat pumped up. And so that would be the context of that comment, and I feel strongly about it — just as, many years ago, [U.S. President] General [Dwight] Eisenhower warned [PDF] about a Military-Industrial Complex. I just wanted to make a point: defend ourselves, screen ourselves, do everything we can to go after terrorists and defeat terrorism, because it is a threat, it is an enemy — but let's keep it in perspective. Let's keep it in context, because the United States has many needs. We have needs to deal with the poverty of some of our people, education, the environment. There are lots of things America needs to do, and we have to make sure we only spend that which is absolutely essential on our military, on our police forces, and on our [anti-]terrorist activities.
george:
Follow the fucking money.
But, yeah, I know. As with Iraq, NOW he brings it up!!!
george walton
d/a
Starting yesterday, the NY Times has a good 5-part series by David Rohde, a reporter of theirs kidnapped last November along with his translator and driver by his interview subject and held captive for 7 mos. until their escape. Perhaps Afghanistan lacks the internet, but he describes the tribal areas where they ended up as having good electricity and internet access where the captors could listen to American broadcasts and give him English language Pakistani newspapers.
My Afghan stepfather was raised in a family of diplomats. It's hard to believe, but in the '50s Kabul was a westernized, cosmopolitan city where women could wear skirts, heels and lipstick. And don't forget all the hippie ... view full comment
Starting yesterday, the NY Times has a good 5-part series by David Rohde, a reporter of theirs kidnapped last November along with his translator and driver by his interview subject and held captive for 7 mos. until their escape. Perhaps Afghanistan lacks the internet, but he describes the tribal areas where they ended up as having good electricity and internet access where the captors could listen to American broadcasts and give him English language Pakistani newspapers.
My Afghan stepfather was raised in a family of diplomats. It's hard to believe, but in the '50s Kabul was a westernized, cosmopolitan city where women could wear skirts, heels and lipstick. And don't forget all the hippie trekkers who went through there in the '60s, usu. on their way to Shangri-La (Kathmandu), receiving excellent hospitality along the way. It started going to hell in a handbasket in the mid '70s with a coup, then the death spiral began with the Soviet invasion.
A disturbing report by the typically well-informed Bergen. I think we can agree that the leadership of the Taliban has effectively meshed with AQ; that losing the nation-state platform of Afghanistan to them, crude as it is, would still be a major problem; and that the much more important Pakistan is probably unfixable with a Taliban-ruled state next door.
On the other hand, I think we can be pretty confident of our ability to prevent a Taliban takeover. But if securing Afghanistan means "defeating the Taliban", we can kiss our asses goodbye. I think it's entirely feasible to contain the Taliban and prevent them from taking over the state. We can also probably knock off their leadership with ... view full comment
A disturbing report by the typically well-informed Bergen. I think we can agree that the leadership of the Taliban has effectively meshed with AQ; that losing the nation-state platform of Afghanistan to them, crude as it is, would still be a major problem; and that the much more important Pakistan is probably unfixable with a Taliban-ruled state next door.
On the other hand, I think we can be pretty confident of our ability to prevent a Taliban takeover. But if securing Afghanistan means "defeating the Taliban", we can kiss our asses goodbye. I think it's entirely feasible to contain the Taliban and prevent them from taking over the state. We can also probably knock off their leadership with enough reliability to fundamentally change the equation. But to the extent that most rank-and-file "Taliban" are essentially the traditional tribal fighters of the Pashtun nation, they are no more going to be defeated in their tribal fastnesses by us than they have been by anyone else who has tried, and it's a pretty impressive list.
We need to be in for the long haul, which means for now being careful not to inflate expectations about what can be gained by dumping in a bunch more grunts, and placing a great deal of emphasis on building the sort of long-term relationships that produce real intelligence of the sort that can maximize our technological advantages. It's also important not to exaggerate the centrality of the camps--a seminar on explosives and tactics doesn't need hundreds of square miles of Afghan real estate to be effective, and visa-free travel between the US and, say, Hamburg or Londonistan still looks like a bigger threat to me. If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
So, I see the "Obama Bin Laden I know" has been corrected to the "Osama Bin Laden I know," in the About the Author section.
So, I see the "Obama Bin Laden I know" has been corrected to the "Osama Bin Laden I know," in the About the Author section.
Excellent post, RP, my sentiments exactly. Now, if we can just get POTUS to make a decision....
Excellent post, RP, my sentiments exactly. Now, if we can just get POTUS to make a decision....
Thanks, Butch. Now if we can just get the Tigers to find their offense...
I think O's playing this one about right now. He had to be disabused of his naieve "Iraq Bad/Afghanistan Good" campaign oversimplification, and it appears this has been done. I'd much rather he now use his famous intellect to make a good decision rather than just a quick one. After all, we've got more troops in Afghanistan now than we have ever had...
Thanks, Butch. Now if we can just get the Tigers to find their offense...
I think O's playing this one about right now. He had to be disabused of his naieve "Iraq Bad/Afghanistan Good" campaign oversimplification, and it appears this has been done. I'd much rather he now use his famous intellect to make a good decision rather than just a quick one. After all, we've got more troops in Afghanistan now than we have ever had...
If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
Amen to that, I am not sure how well we can secure Kabul, but if we can, and if we do turn it into something reasonably westernized that will have a pretty pernicious effect on the taliban maintaining discipline. The allure of bright lights big cities vs torch light mud huts.
If we can secure the major cities, the camps they may establish in the boondocks begin to look more like mousetraps than threats.
Amen to that, I am not sure how well we can secure Kabul, but if we can, and if we do turn it into something reasonably westernized that will have a pretty pernicious effect on the taliban maintaining discipline. The allure of bright lights big cities vs torch light mud huts.
"....and if we do turn Kabul into something reasonably westernized...."
gw:
Las Vegas, maybe. Bright lights and condoms. Comped.
g
"....and if we do turn Kabul into something reasonably westernized...."
gw:
Las Vegas, maybe. Bright lights and condoms. Comped.
g