The state, Max Weber wrote in his classic essay "Politics as a Vocation," "is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." Our government is struggling to create such a state in Iraq, one strong enough to monopolize the use of force within its territory. To achieve this, we are using the physical force of the U.S. military against (some of) the private militias that have sprung up since the fall of Saddam Hussein. There can't be an effective Iraqi state until these militias are disarmed or incorporated into the Iraqi army and subjected to its chain of command. It is exceedingly strange, then, that we have brought private militias of our own into Iraq.
In September, one of these private entities--a North Carolina-based company called Blackwater USA--became the subject of scrutiny when its guards fired into a crowd and killed 17 Iraqi civilians. Blackwater, which has a $1.2 billion State Department contract, is the largest of the dozens of private security firms currently operating in Iraq--firms that provide protection for top American officials, reconstruction projects, residents of the Green Zone, convoys of different sorts, and even the U.S. military itself (the Pentagon employs 7,300 private security guards inside the country). Blackwater's employees, of course, are not fighting a private war--Iraq is an American war--but they do get into firefights on their own, for their own reasons; and these firefights are not always approved by the U.S. military. Blackwater and similar firms are private in another sense, too: The U.S. government keeps no record of the security guards who have died or been wounded--nor, needless to say, of the Iraqi civilians the guards have killed.
Mercenaries like Blackwater have a bad reputation. But is that reputation really deserved? Two books published in the last several years have examined the role of private security firms in Iraq--one from the left, one from the right. Jeremy Scahill's Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army is informative but written as if readers already know the argument and so it is necessary only to present Blackwater's history in appropriately indignant tones. Then there is Gerald Schumacher's A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq, which defends the contractors but also considers in detail the criticism directed against them. (This happens shamefully often these days: political correctness on the left, intellectual engagement on the right.) I believe Scahill is right; but I also believe that it is important actually to make the argument against mercenaries--and not merely to assume it.
Consider first an example of possible mercenary usefulness. During the wars of the former Yugoslavia, the Clinton administration wanted to help the Croatian army, which was in headlong retreat, badly battered by Serb attacks. But Clinton also thought he had good political reasons to avoid sending U.S. troops into battle. So, instead, his administration permitted a private U.S. firm to conduct training exercises with Croat soldiers--some of which, Schumacher writes, "turned into hostile encounters with the enemy." Thanks partly to this assistance, the Serbs were defeated and driven out of Croatian territory.
A big success, right? Not necessarily. Might it not have been better in the long run--better at deterring future Serb attacks, better at preparing the American people for just interventions (and making unjust interventions harder)--if President Clinton had gone to Congress and laid out the argument for helping the Croats? Using private soldiers makes policy invisible and so reduces (or eliminates entirely) its political costs. But it is a crucial feature of democratic decision-making that politicians should pay the costs of the decisions they make. They should also get credit for the benefits. And then voters can study the balance sheet.
Indeed, the question of accountability--for the highest-ranking politicians, the lowest-ranking fighters, and everyone in between--undergirds most of the arguments against the use of mercenaries. Take the standard claim that mercenaries are cheap, which they often are. Since many security companies compete for these contracts, and since government agencies and aid organizations are looking for inexpensive help, there are strong incentives to skimp on training, equipment, and battlefield support. And, at any given moment, in any given place, despite the number of companies, the demand for private soldiers may exceed the supply, and so the people hiring them won't be able to insist on high standards of competence and provision. The result, writes Schumacher, "has been a ... flood of relatively unskilled and inexperienced contractors on the battlefield." Without sufficient training and without sufficient equipment or support--Schumacher lists what is often missing: Kevlar helmets, body armor, armored cars, trained medics, medical evacuation helicopters, hovering attack planes--"they compensate by asserting a level of aggressiveness that they hope will ward off would-be attackers." There is no question, he says, "that civilian security firms have gotten out of hand at times." Soldiers, of course, get out of hand at times, too; and, in Iraq, training, equipment, and support have often been inadequate, with terrible consequences for both U.S. personnel and Iraqi civilians. But that is the result of political decisions, not market processes. And, for such decisions, we know whom to hold accountable.
It is not just accountability for politicians that matters; equally important is the question of accountability for individual fighters. And soldiers who get out of hand are accountable in ways that mercenaries are not. At least in the best cases, soldiers are trained to fight in accordance with a code of conduct enforced by military courts, which in turn are overseen by civilian courts. By contrast, though a voluntary code of conduct has been accepted by many of the security companies operating in Iraq, the code doesn't provide any enforcement mechanism. Under Order 17 of the Transitional Administrative Law, approved by Paul Bremer in 2004, private security guards are immune from prosecution in Iraqi courts. American soldiers are also immune, but they can be prosecuted in military courts. By contrast, it remains unclear whether contractors can be tried by the military. There has been some talk about applying military law to contractors working for the Pentagon and the State Department--or, at least, to the American citizens among them; many private soldiers are not American--but the Supreme Court may not allow this.
American mercenaries can, theoretically, be brought home and tried in federal courts. But then witnesses would also have to be brought over--and the evidence, too, with guarantees that it had not been tampered with en route. In practice, it would be very difficult to secure crime scenes in a war zone and produce evidence that would stand up in a U.S. court. Nor, until the September killings by Blackwater guards, have American officials shown any interest in doing this. Mercenaries suspected of crimes are sometimes sent home (but not for trial) or dismissed from one security company and hired by another. As Columbia professor Scott Horton told The New York Times in October, there are some 100,000 American contractors in Iraq, yet not one has been prosecuted for an act of violence. He then invited us to "[i]magine a town of 100,000, and there hasn't been a prosecution in three years." But that comparison doesn't tell the whole story, for the town's population would include children and old people, while the combatant contractor population is almost entirely young men (and a few women), for whom rates of violence, even in zones of peace, are much higher than the U.S. average. Not a single prosecution. That means mercenaries in Iraq are radically unaccountable; their fire is free.
The new regulations for such contractors adopted by the Pentagon and State Department in early December do little to fix the problem. True, they specify minimal standards for training and set limits on the use of force; but, if one tries to imagine how these standards and limits could be enforced, and how many monitors and military police would be necessary, it gets harder and harder to envision a realistic scenario in which mercenaries are actually held accountable.
If we want to maintain accountability in war, then, we had best take a statist view of military activity. I don't want to argue that private armies run by commercial companies, political parties, religious organizations, or governmentson-the-sly are everywhere and always a bad idea; but they are mostly a bad idea. The state is the only reliable agent of public responsibility that we have. Of course, it often isn't reliable, and it often doesn't represent a democratic public. One might plausibly argue that the army of a tyrannical state is a private army. Still, there isn't any agency other than the state in the contemporary world that can authorize and then control the use of force--and whose officials are (sometimes) accountable to the rest of us.
Weber's definition suggests that the state is constituted by its monopoly on the use of force. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, justified by its monopoly. This is what states are for; this is what they have to do before they do anything else--shut down the private wars, disarm the private armies, lock up the warlords. It is a very dangerous business to loosen the state's grip on the use of violence, to allow war to become anything other than a public responsibility.
There are, of course, exceptions to every rule. Speaking at a conference of arms merchants and war contractors in Amman, Jordan, in March 2006, Blackwater vice chairman J. Cofer Black offered to stop the killing in Darfur. "We've war-gamed this with professionals," he said. "We can do this." Back in the United States, another Blackwater official, Chris Taylor, reiterated the offer.
Since neither the United Nations nor nato has any intention of deploying a military force that would actually be capable of stopping the Darfur genocide, should we send in mercenaries? Scahill quotes Max Boot, the leading neoconservative writer on military affairs, arguing forcefully that there is nothing else to do. Allowing private contractors to secure Darfur "is deemed unacceptable by the moral giants who run the United Nations," Boot writes. "They claim that it is objectionable to employ--sniff--mercenaries. More objectionable, it seems, than passing empty resolutions, sending ineffectual peace-keeping forces and letting genocide continue."
Some of us might prefer something like the International Brigade that fought in Spain over a force of Blackwater mercenaries. But the International Brigade was also a private militia, organized by the Comintern and never under the control of the Spanish republic. Does it matter that most of its members fought for ideological rather than commercial reasons? Scahill tells us that Blackwater is run by far-right Christian nationalists--for me, as for him, that doesn't make things better.
Whatever Blackwater's motives, I won't join the "moral giants" who would rather do nothing at all than send mercenaries to Darfur. If the Comintern could field an army and stop the killing, that would be all right with me, too. But we should acknowledge that making this exception would also be a radical indictment of the states that could do what has to be done and, instead, do nothing at all. There should always be public accountability for military action--and sometimes for military inaction as well.
Michael Walzer is a contributing editor at The New Republic.
By Michael Walzer
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COMMENTS (22)
What are the odds of the "Blackwater to Darfur" thing actually happening?
What are the odds of the "Blackwater to Darfur" thing actually happening?
As Walzer concludes, doing something is better than doing nothing, and if doing something means mercenaries, then so be it. As to the lack of accountability, I've always thought that America, almost uniquely, subjects its citizens to American law, wherever in the world they are. Thus, pedophiles are busted upon returning from their foreign forays. There may be logistical problems of bringing in witnesses, but for heinous crimes, like those committed by Blackwater, it should be worth the effort. The foot-dragging and bureaucratic stonewalling which impedes indictments for the Blackwater massacre of September 2007 is inexcusable.
As Walzer concludes, doing something is better than doing nothing, and if doing something means mercenaries, then so be it. As to the lack of accountability, I've always thought that America, almost uniquely, subjects its citizens to American law, wherever in the world they are. Thus, pedophiles are busted upon returning from their foreign forays. There may be logistical problems of bringing in witnesses, but for heinous crimes, like those committed by Blackwater, it should be worth the effort. The foot-dragging and bureaucratic stonewalling which impedes indictments for the Blackwater massacre of September 2007 is inexcusable.
Why are we even having this discussion? This is another thing like torture that I never thought we'd ever have to talk about. Mercenaries are always contrary to the idea of having a professional standing army. And there is just no comparison. Having an accountable, non-ideological (beyond their loyalty to the State), professionally trained and equipped force vs. the lowest bidder, ragtag forces of a group of people dedicated at best to their money or at worst to some severe form of eschtatology (where == (Christian, Muslim, the Comintern, etc.)) seems like a no brainer to me. What is the difference between Blackwater and the Mahdi Army if neither of them are accountable to any s ... view full comment
Why are we even having this discussion? This is another thing like torture that I never thought we'd ever have to talk about. Mercenaries are always contrary to the idea of having a professional standing army. And there is just no comparison. Having an accountable, non-ideological (beyond their loyalty to the State), professionally trained and equipped force vs. the lowest bidder, ragtag forces of a group of people dedicated at best to their money or at worst to some severe form of eschtatology (where == (Christian, Muslim, the Comintern, etc.)) seems like a no brainer to me. What is the difference between Blackwater and the Mahdi Army if neither of them are accountable to any state?
It's just a shame we've gotten to the point where we have to consider this. I miss the good old days where we had to try and figure out what "sexual relations" with an intern really meant.
This question is critical to our future in world events, and it is of the utmost importance in an ethical sense. First, one has to be committed to the idea of the so-called 'integrity of the state'--and by that I mean the belief that the survival of one's country is foremost--in order to argue that we must pursue any means at our disposal to ensure that. Needless to say, this is an issue that is worthy of a book-length argument, not a blog. It entails consideration of our highest goals--the spread of democracy, human rights-- (not to mention the greed-inspired desires of control of oil-assets, nuclear dominance, etc.) and the honest assessment of the value of those goals to those who are a ... view full comment
This question is critical to our future in world events, and it is of the utmost importance in an ethical sense. First, one has to be committed to the idea of the so-called 'integrity of the state'--and by that I mean the belief that the survival of one's country is foremost--in order to argue that we must pursue any means at our disposal to ensure that. Needless to say, this is an issue that is worthy of a book-length argument, not a blog. It entails consideration of our highest goals--the spread of democracy, human rights-- (not to mention the greed-inspired desires of control of oil-assets, nuclear dominance, etc.) and the honest assessment of the value of those goals to those who are at the other end of the action.
It seems to me that at this point in world history, we have no justification for interference, intervention in those Islamic countries whose evolution must occur on their own timetables. It is not up to us to resolve tribal conflicts, nor even to rectify the plight of women in their society. Obvious genocide and ethnic cleansing are another matter.
I realize that I have taken a position that is extremely difficult to defend, but it seems to me that our best hope for effectiveness in world politics is first to ensure our own survival as a functioning democracy/republic, by adhering to the principles of our own constitution and the rules of civilized society as set out in the Geneva conventions. We must show the rest of the world what our values are, by example, not by the actions of our sorry, tragic present Administration.
So, finally, back to the question of mercenary private forces--NO. They represent our failure as a nation to conduct international affairs as an integrated nation subject to the rules of international law, but rather one that is driven by and now dependent upon what money will buy. And at what cost to our citizens? We are now in an economic disaster that a trillion-dollar war has caused.
One of the supreme ironies of the Bush era has been the logical tension between the Theory of the Unitary Executive and the fact of that executive outsourcing its the physical muscle by which it implements its will in the real world.
One of the supreme ironies of the Bush era has been the logical tension between the Theory of the Unitary Executive and the fact of that executive outsourcing its the physical muscle by which it implements its will in the real world.
OF COURSE, HE IS THE DECIDER.
OF COURSE, HE IS THE DECIDER.
Perhaps this might add context:
Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries
THESE, in the day when heaven was falling
The hour when earth's foundations fled,
Followed their mercenary calling,
And took their wages, and are dead.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
A.E. Housman
Perhaps this might add context:
Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries
THESE, in the day when heaven was falling
The hour when earth's foundations fled,
Followed their mercenary calling,
And took their wages, and are dead.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
A.E. Housman
Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries (XXXVI)
THESE, in the day when heaven was falling
The hour when earth's foundations fled,
Followed their mercenary calling,
And took their wages, and are dead.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
A.E. Housman
Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries (XXXVI)
THESE, in the day when heaven was falling
The hour when earth's foundations fled,
Followed their mercenary calling,
And took their wages, and are dead.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
A.E. Housman
Or, alternatively, this logic:
"Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, bu ... view full comment
Or, alternatively, this logic:
"Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe...."
Niccolo Machiavelli
Are we supposed to have forgotten what hundreds of years of history have proven?
One either believes in human dignity or one does not.
One either believes in the presumption of innocense or one does not.
One either understands human nature or one does not.
What has changed in human nature that would lead us to believe that mercenaries can now be trusted to have a true patriotic response and, if necessary, the willingness to act selflessly?
Until recently, I believed that it was illegal for anyone but the state to maintain a standing army within our country.
In Vietnam the U.S. hired Cambodian mercenaries at fifty dollars a head. How much patriotism for the U.S. is it possible they may have felt?
W ... view full comment
Are we supposed to have forgotten what hundreds of years of history have proven?
One either believes in human dignity or one does not.
One either believes in the presumption of innocense or one does not.
One either understands human nature or one does not.
What has changed in human nature that would lead us to believe that mercenaries can now be trusted to have a true patriotic response and, if necessary, the willingness to act selflessly?
Until recently, I believed that it was illegal for anyone but the state to maintain a standing army within our country.
In Vietnam the U.S. hired Cambodian mercenaries at fifty dollars a head. How much patriotism for the U.S. is it possible they may have felt?
When U.S. forces traveling with Cambodian mercenaries came under attack the U.S. troops called for a dust-off. When the helicopters arrived to remove the troops who were under fire the Cambodians turned their weapons on the U.S. troops so that the Cambodians would be the first to be dust-off. This is just one example of the patriotism of mercenaries. People who fight for money are not the same as those who fight for democracy and liberty. One group of fighters is motivated by self-preservation and personal gain, the other is motivated to protect his comrades and is inspired to make the greatest sacrifice a person can give - his or her own life.
Please explain to me why anyone would rather fight beside mercenaries than patriots? The concept of mercenary standing armies within our borders that are not under the UCMJ is a perversion of our democratic republic, and the practice must be brought to an end by tomorrow if not sooner.
The idea that the use of mercenaries is a subject for intellectual discussion while mercenary armies continue to exist is an abomination against a democratic republic. It is on the same level as the acceptance of torture, which is another concept that only cowards discuss objectively, because of what such a discussion says about our humanity.
I am sick of this habit pundits have grown accustomed to, where they revisit the despicable with absurd rationalizations and try to pass them off as legal decisions, when the fact is that acceptance of mercenary armies and torture not only denies the reality of man's inhumanity to man, but it dwells in the neather regions of mental disturbance. When did Americans conclude that our leaders should be sociopaths?
I am sick of this sad and desperate era created by fear and weakness. Our nation needs to return to the principles of democracy, due process, equal opportunity, non-discrimination, and become members of the world community. The U.S. needs to make a stand that it supports the protection of the innocent and the punishment of the guilty under the rule of law.
Never again should citizens allow our nation to be manipulated by the disrespectful and callous. The world has had too much of that. Never before has our nation needed real change. It needs a new direction that honors its citizens, respects the rights of others, and defends the principles that made our nation great.
It is time to kick the sadists and the corrupt out of our government. This is the change that the American people so desperately require. Our legacy cannot be a decline in integrity that puts our basic rights, fought for by generations of brave Americans, on the chopping block of expediency.
So they are willing to stop the violence in Darfur. I suspect they could do it -- probably a fairly modest force would have an enormous impact. But what would they do on the side? And who is supposed to pay? In reality, this is just trolling for business on their part. And if something goes wrong, then whoever hired them (plus the US) will pay the price for any civilians shot up, women raped, etc.
Private mercenary armies are a step backward. We shouldn't even be thinking about it.
So they are willing to stop the violence in Darfur. I suspect they could do it -- probably a fairly modest force would have an enormous impact. But what would they do on the side? And who is supposed to pay? In reality, this is just trolling for business on their part. And if something goes wrong, then whoever hired them (plus the US) will pay the price for any civilians shot up, women raped, etc.
Private mercenary armies are a step backward. We shouldn't even be thinking about it.
It seems that ruling out the usefulness of private mercenary forces so quickly is not only wrong-headed, but poorly thought out. The fact that it seems unfeasible today is always a terrible reason not to do something. One can quickly imagine governance structures put into place that could dramatically increase the accountability of private military firms, without ruining their willingness to be deployed places it is too politically sensitive to deploy national troops.
Off-hand I can imagine an international agreement at the United Nations about the contracting and deployment of forces meeting a specific criteria to handle humanitarian crises like that in Darfur. Of course they soldiers would ... view full comment
It seems that ruling out the usefulness of private mercenary forces so quickly is not only wrong-headed, but poorly thought out. The fact that it seems unfeasible today is always a terrible reason not to do something. One can quickly imagine governance structures put into place that could dramatically increase the accountability of private military firms, without ruining their willingness to be deployed places it is too politically sensitive to deploy national troops.
Off-hand I can imagine an international agreement at the United Nations about the contracting and deployment of forces meeting a specific criteria to handle humanitarian crises like that in Darfur. Of course they soldiers would be accountable to the ICC, and so on and so forth. Obviously this won't happen tomorrow, it is politically unfeasible right now, but not impossible. We certainly shouldn't dismiss it so easily.
Where to begin?
We have the Founding Father's feared "professional" standing army lured by $20,000 enlistment bonuses and backed up by mercenaries making $20,000 a month to guard visiting congressional delegations in Baghdad because we can't spare U.S. soldiers for such duties.
Contractors provide KFC and McDonald's franchises to relieve our "professional" soldiers of the onerous KP duty even as Kuwaitis are hired as truck drivers to haul goods from Kuwait to Baghdad for $1500 a month - a job a private soldier could do and still be a soldier. In a crisis - will the KFC cook be able to lay down his soup ladle and become a rifleman?
The alliance of contractors and "Professional" soldiers is unh ... view full comment
Where to begin?
We have the Founding Father's feared "professional" standing army lured by $20,000 enlistment bonuses and backed up by mercenaries making $20,000 a month to guard visiting congressional delegations in Baghdad because we can't spare U.S. soldiers for such duties.
Contractors provide KFC and McDonald's franchises to relieve our "professional" soldiers of the onerous KP duty even as Kuwaitis are hired as truck drivers to haul goods from Kuwait to Baghdad for $1500 a month - a job a private soldier could do and still be a soldier. In a crisis - will the KFC cook be able to lay down his soup ladle and become a rifleman?
The alliance of contractors and "Professional" soldiers is unholy. We are manning 700 foreign installations and fighting guerrilla wars and occupations in two countries and our army is exhausted - stretched to its limits.
Universal military training would provide a citizen soldier reserve when an emergency arose and it would also make clear to everyone that citizenship is a shared responsibility and a civic commitment.
It would also relieve our citizens of the notion that defense is someone else's job and therefore such a citizenry would be less inclined to elect officials who see foreign threats behind every bush (pun intended).
We need to focus our forces on the strategic elements (Navy and Air Force) close most of our foreign bases, thereby sending a signal to Europe, Japan and Korea to start bearing the cost of their own defense.
Moreover, a lower global profile would lessen the perception of the U.S. as menacing imperial colossus.
More trained soldiers and fewer foreign installations equals a more active citizenry and a less warlike people. The mercenary encourages war. The citizen soldier discourages war but enables the fighting of one when necessary.
Distilling from the chaff, the mercenary dark army acts without accountability and beyond law and morality. Although an army of paid volunteers already creates an atmosphere of willing 'want to be's', these anonymous and well paid mercs exist out of our national site and mind. The transition from application on the 'excused and accepted' embattled streets of Iraq to the alleys of New Orleans has already been demonstrated. Pre-war Germany had such paramilitary ("Storm Division") paid to suppress opposition to Hitler's rise to power. It's always money.
Distilling from the chaff, the mercenary dark army acts without accountability and beyond law and morality. Although an army of paid volunteers already creates an atmosphere of willing 'want to be's', these anonymous and well paid mercs exist out of our national site and mind. The transition from application on the 'excused and accepted' embattled streets of Iraq to the alleys of New Orleans has already been demonstrated. Pre-war Germany had such paramilitary ("Storm Division") paid to suppress opposition to Hitler's rise to power. It's always money.
There are many other options on the historical and constitutional plane than those available to our present government. That would be an oxymoronic mock-republican clerical-democracy with anglophile military institutions grafted on and, for instance, no well regulated militia at all and wierdness like a "global" economy but hardly any merchant marine to speak of.
Introducing 17th-century "protestant" or "catholic" or, for that matter, all manner of "tribal" free companies of mercenary soldiers -- unemployed vets or gun-nuts on steroids -- into that already awkward situation is dangerous in both the usual and strange ways, as the surprising deployment of Blackwater to New Orleans and DynCorp t ... view full comment
There are many other options on the historical and constitutional plane than those available to our present government. That would be an oxymoronic mock-republican clerical-democracy with anglophile military institutions grafted on and, for instance, no well regulated militia at all and wierdness like a "global" economy but hardly any merchant marine to speak of.
Introducing 17th-century "protestant" or "catholic" or, for that matter, all manner of "tribal" free companies of mercenary soldiers -- unemployed vets or gun-nuts on steroids -- into that already awkward situation is dangerous in both the usual and strange ways, as the surprising deployment of Blackwater to New Orleans and DynCorp to the Miami-Dade Ballot Board demonstrates pretty well, I think.
Here are two options that fit into "a republic, if you can keep it ...:"
A Foreign Legion
The US could maintain something on the order of the French Foreign Legion for limited purposes, instead of what the anglophile elite in Washington are aiming for -- a sort of East India Company (Carlyle Group?)with its own Army, Navy, and Marines.
The Legion Etranger, like our jumped-up private military contractors, are mercenary enlistees, but they typically, have disciplined and professional officers, a pretty good reputation for loyalty to France, and with what our blow-hard, chicken-hawk politicians would call a "path" out of US, South African, or Soviet jails, and towards earned, not birthright or bloodline, citizenship.
Just in case, of course, the French Republic -- unlike Anglo-America -- has an orderly and efficient system of professional and reserve military formation, with no aristocratic privileges or exemptions at all, as well as military industry that can both compete and co-produce materiel with little of the sort of corruption that does subvert the Anglo-American economy and government routinely. There was a treason problem between the Fourth and Fifth Republic, but it was managed well enough.
So, other than speaking French, often as a second language, what is wrong with the "LE" that the heirs of Lafayette could not emulate?
A Well Regulated Militia
The Federalists then and now never liked the concept of an armed citizenry, so state militias granfathered in under the second amendment were never all that well "regulated" -- meaning provided for with the same doctrine and training or interchangeable and appropriate complementary ordnance. One exception, the Republic of Texas though, like the US in the early days, pretty much bankrupt, did manage to have a steam-powered warship and Colt revolvers for the light cavalry well in advance of the anglophile Navy and War Departments in Washington.
After the Civil War, the state militia were quickly phased out and disarmed altogether after 1905. Harry S. Truman was the last President to have been elected a militia officer earlier in his political career and the last Democrat to politically-connected General Officer for incompetence and insubordination. HST was also a reserve officer and, after leaving the White House, eventually retired on a Reserve Colonel's pension instead of becoming the ward of Anglo-American merchant bankers and such.
If we had any vestige of what the Second Amendment envisioned but never realized, it would be something on the order of what the Roman Republic had and the Swiss Confederation still has, namely a military obligation coterminous with suffrage and a regimental system of military training and affiliation from 18 to 58.
That system used to provide for volunteer companies which could be rented out to foreign governments with one still hired out to the Vatican. It is mercenary from the lessee's perspective but not the cantonal lessor's or from a personal perspective.
This Swiss sytem is still interesting today, because many NGO workers in great hazard around the world are Swiss and have volunteered in lieu of sitting around in a damp dark cave off and on for 40 years. And, ironically, the Swiss military recently began deploying overseas in support of these aid workers, in part, because there was not a little shame/pride associated with the danger of humanitarian work relative to cross-country skiing and mountain-bike recreation.
The Swiss have a Ministry of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sport.
Curiously, the Swiss anthem is set to the same music as "God Save the Queen", but unlike the US today, their military institutions are not a parody of Horse Guards Parade, The Admiralty, Whitehall, or The Circus. The Swiss seem to be liberal music, language, religion, and aesthetics but strict about what it takes to have and keep a republic.
I think Professor Walzer's article misses a main point. An armed Blackwater squad of guards providing force protection in a high-threat environment might (but only might) go too far against the principle of state monopoly of the use of force. However, the reality of today's complex national security problems (Darfur, Afghanistan, Kosovo, others) is that our operations in these environments are a mixture of aggressive and nonaggressive actions, and it is not easy to draw distinctions or categories between what Blackwater or MPRI or DynCorp can and cannot do. One reason these distinctions are hard is that the requirement is to conduct a range of missions seamlessly; another reason is that w ... view full comment
I think Professor Walzer's article misses a main point. An armed Blackwater squad of guards providing force protection in a high-threat environment might (but only might) go too far against the principle of state monopoly of the use of force. However, the reality of today's complex national security problems (Darfur, Afghanistan, Kosovo, others) is that our operations in these environments are a mixture of aggressive and nonaggressive actions, and it is not easy to draw distinctions or categories between what Blackwater or MPRI or DynCorp can and cannot do. One reason these distinctions are hard is that the requirement is to conduct a range of missions seamlessly; another reason is that when we draw distinctions, astute threats take advantage of them (shooting from private homes, using children and women and ill in deceptive ways, etc.). So the real problem is that DOD needs to take the interagency lead in laying out a system of how private contractors will work in complex national security environments. What are the limitations, what is the management and oversight process, how are interfaces handled, etc.? As is so often true, new operations outruns old management and oversight practices. This doesn't mean parts of private security companies can't do a solid job in these challenging environments (with logistics, training, development support, etc., to include the weapons needed for self-defence), just that we haven't laid out a coherent approach and system before we "discovered" this was needed.
I think Professor Walzer's article misses a main point. An armed Blackwater squad of guards providing force protection in a high-threat environment might (but only might) go too far against the principle of state monopoly of the use of force. However, the reality of today's complex national security problems (Darfur, Afghanistan, Kosovo, others) is that our operations in these environments are a mixture of aggressive and nonaggressive actions, and it is not easy to draw distinctions or categories between what Blackwater or MPRI or DynCorp can and cannot do. One reason these distinctions are hard is that the requirement is to conduct a range of missions seamlessly; another reason is that w ... view full comment
I think Professor Walzer's article misses a main point. An armed Blackwater squad of guards providing force protection in a high-threat environment might (but only might) go too far against the principle of state monopoly of the use of force. However, the reality of today's complex national security problems (Darfur, Afghanistan, Kosovo, others) is that our operations in these environments are a mixture of aggressive and nonaggressive actions, and it is not easy to draw distinctions or categories between what Blackwater or MPRI or DynCorp can and cannot do. One reason these distinctions are hard is that the requirement is to conduct a range of missions seamlessly; another reason is that when we draw distinctions, astute threats take advantage of them (shooting from private homes, using children and women and ill in deceptive ways, etc.). So the real problem is that DOD needs to take the interagency lead in laying out a system of how private contractors will work in complex national security environments. What are the limitations, what is the management and oversight process, how are interfaces handled, etc.? As is so often true, new operations outruns old management and oversight practices. This doesn't mean parts of private security companies can't do a solid job in these challenging environments (with logistics, training, development support, etc., to include the weapons needed for self-defence), just that we haven't laid out a coherent approach and system before we "discovered" this was needed.
So how long will gc_wall have to talk to stop the genocide?
So how long will gc_wall have to talk to stop the genocide?
I find it very troubling that a corporation like Blackwater possess advanced weapons, employs a private
military, and enjoys benefits associated with the US military (such as not having their id on the visible bottom of their aircraft) and yet they are not accountable for their actions or overseen as the US military is.
They are able to operate as a loophole to Posse Comitatis domestically and as a band of renegades
in foreign theaters.
Blackwater and their counterparts need to be fully debated by Congress and the American public, which has not been done as they expanded to the private military they are today.
Also, they hold the opinion that the 2nd Amendment
h ... view full comment
I find it very troubling that a corporation like Blackwater possess advanced weapons, employs a private
military, and enjoys benefits associated with the US military (such as not having their id on the visible bottom of their aircraft) and yet they are not accountable for their actions or overseen as the US military is.
They are able to operate as a loophole to Posse Comitatis domestically and as a band of renegades
in foreign theaters.
Blackwater and their counterparts need to be fully debated by Congress and the American public, which has not been done as they expanded to the private military they are today.
Also, they hold the opinion that the 2nd Amendment
has no limitation for weapons as it relates to them.
That is also a great concern.
They employ mercenaries from countries other than the US.
Last, they have operated for two years in San Diego
in a residential area without even one permit from the local level, or any level of government. They had a full weapons range and a helipad and were entertaining
active SEALS and law enforcement who actually helped
build the facility. When they were finally "outed" in the news, they didn't pay one cent of fine.
We can't have this kind of operation functioning outside even of all laws.
In answer to an earlier question on when this could happen, the US Congress would have to be presented with a request for, and for the first time emit, a letter of reprisal. Were such a letter be emitted, the US restrictions on private military expeditions would be overcome as no statute can override a constitutional power.
So if you want those mercenaries in Darfur, take your best shot in the Capitol. I'm sure you can round up sufficient Darfurians with US citizenship and losses in Darfur to make it difficult to vote against such a measure.
In answer to an earlier question on when this could happen, the US Congress would have to be presented with a request for, and for the first time emit, a letter of reprisal. Were such a letter be emitted, the US restrictions on private military expeditions would be overcome as no statute can override a constitutional power.
So if you want those mercenaries in Darfur, take your best shot in the Capitol. I'm sure you can round up sufficient Darfurians with US citizenship and losses in Darfur to make it difficult to vote against such a measure.
Scahills Book makes another important point, which is not mentioned in the article. The danger posed to democratic order by what is in effect a Praetorian Guard for the Republican Party. If such a thing is permissable, how long before we see a similar operation with ties to the Democrats? Is this good for a republic?
The article also derisively lays the blame for inaction in Darfur at the feet of the United Nations Organisation, as if this is a body charged with such interventions. In fact the UN has no mandate for armed intervention - nor would anyone want a one world army, capable of unilateral force projection. The UN was formed as a venue for rich countries to debate. Its founding member ... view full comment
Scahills Book makes another important point, which is not mentioned in the article. The danger posed to democratic order by what is in effect a Praetorian Guard for the Republican Party. If such a thing is permissable, how long before we see a similar operation with ties to the Democrats? Is this good for a republic?
The article also derisively lays the blame for inaction in Darfur at the feet of the United Nations Organisation, as if this is a body charged with such interventions. In fact the UN has no mandate for armed intervention - nor would anyone want a one world army, capable of unilateral force projection. The UN was formed as a venue for rich countries to debate. Its founding member, host and most frequent Veto user is....Uncle Sam.
Therefore to complain that the UN "does nothing" while simultaneously denying it the abilty to do anything is nonsensical.
Prof. Walzer compares rates of criminality of a group of contractors with the general populous solely based on age and gender, "But that comparison doesn’t tell the whole story, for the town’s population would include children and old people, while the combatant contractor population is almost entirely young men (and a few women), for whom rates of violence, even in zones of peace, are much higher than the U.S. average. Not a single prosecution. That means mercenaries in Iraq are radically unaccountable."
What Prof. Walzer fails to understand is that contractors are screened whereas the general population is not. Felony convictions as well as any misdemeanor domestic violence charge auto ... view full comment
Prof. Walzer compares rates of criminality of a group of contractors with the general populous solely based on age and gender, "But that comparison doesn’t tell the whole story, for the town’s population would include children and old people, while the combatant contractor population is almost entirely young men (and a few women), for whom rates of violence, even in zones of peace, are much higher than the U.S. average. Not a single prosecution. That means mercenaries in Iraq are radically unaccountable."
What Prof. Walzer fails to understand is that contractors are screened whereas the general population is not. Felony convictions as well as any misdemeanor domestic violence charge automatically eliminate any potential candidate from consideration. They must also have served honorably in the military for at least four years. Now, contrast that group with the general population and you will see that the levels of conviction are extremely low.
We can't expect them to be perfect any more than we can expect our domestic police forces to be perfect. And for those of you who think contractors in Iraq make $20,000/mo it's less than half of that now.
I'm amazed at the lack of understanding of this industry by the media and think-tanks. Most books on the subject fail to even get the history right. Privateers practically defeated the British Navy during the American Revolution.
Most "experts" have never even interviewed a single security contractor and have virtually no idea what goes on in Iraq or Afghanistan. No one who take a restaurant review seriously if the reviewer had only seen the menu and never tasted the food. How is it then that so many people take as fact such mediocre journalism. It's not so much an agenda but just pure laziness. Get out in the field ya bums. You might learn something.